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In 1977, the Chicago Police Department opened its files concerning police-in-
volved shootings to inspection by a public interest group, the Chicago Law Enforcement
Study Group. This represents the first time a major cits police force has allowed its
shooting investigation files to be viewed by the public. The following article is based
on excerpts fom that groups report. The study will be presented in two parts. The
first set of material, presented here, deals with the methodolog, shooting types, and
racialfactors involved in the shootings. The set of data to be presented in the Spring
issue deals with shootings of police offcers, variations in shooting over time, and recom-
mendations for shooting control strategies.
THE EDITORS
SHOOTINGS OF AND BY CHICAGO
POLICE: UNCOMMON CRISES
PART I: SHOOTINGS BY CHICAGO
POLICE
WILLIAM A. GELLER* AND KEVIN J. KARALES**
Every year in the United States, several hundred people suffer what
is bureaucratically termed "death by legal intervention-police."'
These annual numbers translate into a daily average of one or two peo-
ple who die at the hands of American police. Perhaps three times as
many people are wounded by police bullets somewhere in the country on
an annual and daily basis. And these numbers pale by comparison to
the number of criminal suspects shot at but missed by police.
This report attempts to describe and study a phenomenon known
as "police shootings," a subject about which little has been known but
much has been said. Widely disparate kinds of interactions are encom-
passed by the term-from self-defense shootings to self-inflicted shoot-
* Research Attorney, American Bar Foundation; J.D. University of Chicago School of
Law, 1975. At the time this piece was written, Mr. Geller was the Director of The Chicago
Law Enforcement Study Group. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the
author.
** Research Associate, Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group.
t These statistics are maintained by the federal government pursuant to an international
classification system. See U.S. CENSus BUREAU, 2 VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, Table 123 at 1-166 (1970) (These fatalities are listed under the heading of "Cause of
Death, Code No. 984."); Sherman & Langworthy, Measuring Homicide by Police Ofjiers, 70 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 546, 548 (1979). See also Takagi, Death by Police Intervention, in U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, A COMMUNITY CONCERN: POUCE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 32 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as A COMMUNrrY CONCERN].
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ings. The different types of shootings are susceptible to very different
types of control, and no single strategy for reducing shootings is relevant
to all types of events. Police and the public at large have a common
interest in identifying and employing the most effective control strate-
gies possible, for the divisive impact which police-involved shootings can
have on the community undermines all other efforts to combat crime
and ensure public safety. Our focus includes not only shootings of civil-
ians by police, but shootings of police as well-shootings inflicted by
civilians and by police officers.
The importance of such research need not be stated at length. Re-
gardless of the justifiability of shootings by police, such incidents some-
times have societal consequences far beyond the injury or death of the
shooting victims. Gilbert Pompa, Director of the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment's Community Relations Service, recently called police shootings
"the most volatile and potentially divisive force in the nation today."'2
Police-involved shootings have played key roles in triggering several of
America's disastrous urban riots, Miami (1980) being the most recent.
Even a single, well-publicized shooting can foster a hostility between
police and community which can take years to undo. As a result, much
of the scholarly, legislative, and administrative attention to deadly force
questions is prompted by both a moral and utilitarian concern over the
social turmoil which police shootings can produce. The social costs
clearly can go beyond the individual and family suffering which follow
the shooting of a police officer or a civilian.
In considering what measures federal and local officials might take
to prevent future shooting-induced riots, it is worth noting the kinds of
incidents which have typically prompted upheaval. Some of the shoot-
ings were entirely within applicable state or local policy. Often, these
were shootings of unarmed, fleeing felony suspects. Other shootings are
clearly without justification and thus can be subjected to both adminis-
trative and prosecutorial process. Our data suggest that, to a significant
extent, police shootings need not be the product of "split-second deci-
sions," a term which can be used as a code defense of any decision be-
cause, "after all, it had to be made in an instant." More effective use of
police policy, training and review processes can better equip officers to
creatively, deliberately, and successfully resolve many potentially vio-
lent situations without resort to deadly force. A number of shootings
which provoke anger, however, cannot be deterred through either prose-
cution or changes in law or policy, for they are accidental discharges,
usually regretted as much by the shooting officer as by the community
2 Pompa, Police Use of Excessive Force: A Community Relations Concern (Aug. 25,
1978) (speech to National Black Police).
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at large.3 These tragic accidents, like most of the shooting incidents
which have occasioned violent community responses, usually have not
been the sole irritant; they have been viewed by communities in the
context of a history of such incidents or in light of much broader social
and economic problems. 4
In sum, the divisive impact which police shootings have had on
American communities over two decades provides an extra incentive to
concerned citizens and policy makers at the local and national levels to
re-examine deadly force policy, training, and practice. In the past,
many such examinations have been conducted without the benefit of
empirically-based portraits of the use of deadly force by and against po-
lice in urban America. This report, and some of the other research to be
mentioned, should help to fill this gap and eliminate some of the guess-
work which has necessarily pervaded prior reform efforts.
I. PRIOR RESEARCH AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESENT STUDY
A number of good law review articles5 have been written in recent
years on the constitutional, statutory, and administrative framework
governing police use of deadly force and the common law rules and his-
torical conditions from which this framework derived. Many of these
articles urge tightening the rules permitting police shootings, critiquing
the current firearms policies in use in most states and municipalities.
Empirical studies are also available. More than half of them have
3 Training, however, may help prevent some of these incidents. A rash of accidental
shootings in Chicago in late 1977 led to loud public protest. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, De-
cember 6, 1977, § 1, at 1.
4 Riots in Miami may be better understood by considering a comment made by the
director of the Community Relations Service's Southeast Region: "[P]olice/minority rela-
tions problems have dominated our work for each of the past 5 years." Sutton, Police Use of
Excessive Force: A Community Relations Concen, in A COMMUNITY CONCERN, supra note 1, at 27.
5 See, e.g., Day, Shooting the Fleeing Felo " State of the Law, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 285 (1978);
Rummel, The Right of Law Enforcement Ofjiers to Use Deadl Force to Eect an Arrest, 14 N.Y.L.F.
749 (1968); Sherman, Restricting the License to Kill-Recent Developments in Police Use of Deadly
Force, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 577 (1978); Sherman, Police Homicide and the Comstitutioin Execution
Without Trial, 33 VAND. L. REv. 71 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Execution Without Trial]; Sher-
man & Langworthy, supra note 1; Tsimbinos, The justifed Use of Deadly Force, 4 CRIM. L.
BULL. 3 (1968); Comment, Policeman's Use ofDeadly Force in Illinois, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 252
(1971); Comment, Deadoy Force to Arrest: Triggering Constitutional Review, 11 HARV. C.R. -
C.L.L. REv. 361 (1976); Comment, Use of Deadl Force in the Arrest Process, 31 LA. L. REV. 131
(1970); Comment,Justifcationfor the Use of Deadly Force in the Ciminal Law, 14 STAN. L. REv.
566 (1961); Note, Aptropiateness of Deadly Force, 1969 How. L.J. 506; Note,Justfable Use of
Deadly Force by the Police: A Statutog Surwq, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 67 (1970). See also
Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacatedsub nom., Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S.
171 (1977); C. MILTON, J. HALLECK, J. LARDNER & G. ALBRECHT, POLICE USE OF DEADLY
FORCE (1977) [hereinafter cited as DEADLY FORC]; MCCREEDY & HAGUE, Administrative and
Legal Aspects of a Poliq to Limit the Use of Fireanrn sy Police Oisers, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1975, at
48-52.
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been published since this research project commenced in 1977. A
number of these studies have examined firearms use policies as well as
shooting data. However, virtually all of the empirical studies of Ameri-
can police-involved shootings6 have collected original data only on
6 W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER AND POWER 275 (1971); B. JENKINS & A.
FAISON, AN ANALYSIS OF 248 PERSONS KILLED BY NEW YORK CITY POLICEMEN (1974); R.
KNOOHUIZEN, R. FAHEY & D. PALMER, THE POLICE AND THEIR USE OF FATAL FORCE IN
CHICAGO (1972); M. MEYER, REPORT TO THE Los ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMIS-
SIONERS ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN LOS ANGELES: OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOT-
INGS, PART FOUR (1980); C. MILTON, ET AL., DEADLY FORCE, supra note 5; Bristow, Police
Ojier Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 93 (1963); Chapman, Police
Poli on Use of Firearms, POLICE CHIEF, July 1967, at 16. Fyfe, Administrative Interventions on
Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examznation, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 309 (1979); Fyfe, Always
Prepared- Police OiDuty Guns, 452 ANNALS 72 (1980); Fyfe, Deadly Force, 1979 FBI L. ENF.
BULL. 7; Fyfe, Geographic Correlates oPolice Shooting,,4 Aicroanalsis, 17 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 101 (1980); Goldkamp, Minorities as Victims of Police Shootings. Interpretations of
Racial Disproportionality and Police Use of Deadly Force, 2 JUST. SYS. J. 169 (1976); Harding &
Fahey, Killings by Chicago Police, 1969-1970: An Empirical Study, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 284 (1973);
Harring, Platt, SpeigIman & Takagi, The Management of Police Killings, 1977 CRIME & SOC.
JUST. 34; Jacobs & Britt, Inequality and Police Use of Deadly Force. An Empirical Assessment of a
Conflict Hypothesis, 26 Soc. PROB. 403 (1979); Kania & Mackey, Police Violence as a Function of
Community Characteristics, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1977); Kobler, Figures (and Perhaps Some Facts)
on Police Killing of Civilians in the United States, 1965-1969, 1975 J. Soc. ISSUES 185; Kobler,
Police Homicide in a Democracy, 1975 J. Soc. ISSUES 163; Margarita, Killing the Police: Myths and
Motives, 452 ANNALS 63 (1980); Robin,Justifiable Homicide by Police Oiers, 54J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 225 (1963); Safer, Dead, Weapons in the Hands of Police Ofiers, On Duty and Of Duty, 49 J.
URB. L. 565 (1972); Takagi, A Garrison State in "Democratic" Society, 1974 CRIM. & SOC. JUST.
27; Uelman, Varieties of Police Poli. A Study of Police Poliy Regarding the Use of Deady Force in
Los Angeles County, 6 LOY. L.A.L. REv. 1 (1973); Yount & O'Rourke, Breaking the Ice A Study of
Accidental Discharges Among Illinois Police Ojfcers, POLICE CHIEF, Apr. 1978, at 72; Bureau of
Criminal Justice Statistics, Div. of Law Enforcement, Cal. Dep't of Justice, Peace Officer
Involved Homicides in California, 1971-1972 (1974) (document No. 18786 in collection of
National Criminal Justice Reference Service); Fyfe, Officer Race and Police Shooting (Nov.
1979) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Soc. of Criminology, Phila-
delphia); Fyfe, Race and Extreme Police-Citizen Violence (paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Cincinnati, Ohio, March, 1979); Fyfe,
Shots Fired: A Typological Examination of New York City Police Firearms Discharges
(1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on file at the School of Criminal Justice, State Univer-
sity of New York at Albany, available through University Microfilms International, Ann Ar-
bor, Michigan) [hereinafter cited as Shots Fired]; Fyfe, Toward A Typology of Police
Shootings (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sci-
ences, Oklahoma City, March, 1980); Gain, Discharge of Firearms Policy: Effecting Justice
Through Administrative Regulation-A Position Paper (report released December 23, 1971
by Oakland Police Chief Charles Gain in explanation of a change in departmental deadly
force policy); New York City Police Academy, Study of Reports Received During 1970 Under
Authority of Standard Operating Procedure No. 9 Series 1969 (1971) (6-page report de-
scribed in abstract No. S-1125 of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency); Office
of Policy and Planning, City of Seattle, Police Use of Deadly Force (January 16, 1978) (Seat-
tle City Council memorandum); Planning and Research Div., Boston Police Dep't, The Use
of Deadly Force by Boston Police Personnel (May 3, 1974) (available as document No. NCJ
26010 through NCJRS); Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, A Study of the Use of
Firearms by Philadelphia Policemen from 1970 Through 1974 (April 1, 1975); Sherman,
Grant Proposal to National Institute of Health: Homicide by Police Officers-Social Forces
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shootings by police; almost none have done the same for shootings of
police, despite the comparative willingness of many departments to re-
lease such information. 7 A few of these studies do cite FBI statistics on
the annual number of police deaths, statistics which have been compiled
since 1960.8 Many of the research efforts which examine shootings by
police consider only fatal shootings, a category frequently referred to as
"police homicides." 9
Some of the studies consider shootings in a single city; others com-
pare several cities; and a few compare states. For the most part, the
sample sizes are too small to generate statistically significant findings.10
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that every available study has retrospec-
tively analyzed pre-existing records generally kept in order to determine
the justifiability of police conduct rather than for research purposes.
(Our study uses the same sort of documents.) The fact that records on
firearms discharges are kept for possible use in disciplinary or criminal
proceedings suggests why researchers have been unable to successfully
conduct contemporaneous studies of police shootings, ie., studies in
which the researcher collects data on the shooting incidents as they oc-
cur, examining the scene of the shooting, interviewing the officers, other
participants and uninvolved eyewitnesses, etc.- Police are extremely un-
likely to talk candidly with researchers about the details of shootings
which are still under departmental and perhaps prosecutorial
investigation.
Most research has been descriptive, providing basic details about
the incidents and their participants. A few recently published or forth-
coming examinations, however, have begun to explore the impact that
social, legal, political, and police management variables have on rates of
shootings by police either in different jurisdictions or in a single jurisdic-
and Public Policy (1977) (unpublished proposal for a major national study now in progress)
[hereinafter cited as Grant Proposal!; Southern Methodist Law School, Report on Police
Shootings (1974) (unpublished report presented to Dallas, Texas Police Dep't).
7 As early as 1959, a West Coast researcher found that information on officers shot could
be "easily obtained by personal interview." Bristow, supra note 6, at 93.
8 Takagi, A Garriron State in "Democratic" Society, supra note 6, challenged FBI statistics
which showed alarming increases in killings of police. Based on data from 1963 through
1971, he argued that while the number of police killed had indeed risen, the rate of killings had
not, for there had been a substantial increase in the number of sworn police officers in the
country during the period studied.
9 See, e.g., Kobler, Police Homicide in a Democracy, supra note 6; Sherman, Execution Without
Trial, supra note 5.
10 See Fyfe, Shots Fired, supra note 6, at 33, 36, 50, 54. Fyfe's report contains a very useful
critique of the prior research (id at 28-54); Sherman, Grant Proposal, supra note 6, at 22-29.
Sherman presents a helpful survey of the terrain covered by earlier empirical investigations.
Fyfe's and Sherman's works were of considerable guidance in our writing of this article. See
also Sultan & Cooper, Sunmary of Research on the Police Use of Dead Force, in A COMMUNITY




Among the various prior and contemporaneous research projects,
three have been most influential in the design of our effort: The Police
Foundation's 1977 report exploring shootings by police in seven cities;
James Fyfe's unpublished 1978 Ph.D. dissertation on five years of shots
fired by the New York City police' 2 and Lawrence Sherman's national
study of the impact of "social forces" and public policy on rates of kill-
ing by police throughout the country. 13
From the Police Foundation's, Fyfe's, Sherman's and earlier stud-
ies, a pattern seems to emerge which, stated without qualification, sup-
ports the following broad assertion:
The most common shooting of a civilian by a police officer in urban
America is one in which an on-duty, uniformed, white officer shoots an
armed, Black male between the ages of 17 and 30 at night in a public
location, in connection with an armed robbery. Typically, the shooting is
subsequently deemed justifiable by the police department following an in-
ternal investigation. Even if the officer is criminally prosecuted, a jury is
unlikely to convict.
This general pattern has prompted considerable interest in the issue
of racism in police shootings. Several researchers have noted that, while
black civilians constitute a large majority of the police shooting victims,
they are also a large majority of those arrested for, or reported to have
committed violent crimes of the sort that might be expected to lead to a
shooting. The explanation of black over-representation among police
shooting victims by reference to arrest or reported crime rates is the sub-
ject of heated public debate. Some people contend that this correlation
disproves allegations of racism by police. Others contend that it proves
nothing, arguing that bigotry influences both the decision to arrest and
officer shooting practices. 14 Caught in the middle are the majority of
11 See discussion of Fyfe's and Sherman's research projects in the text infia.
12 Fyfe has begun to report his findings in published articles and conference papers. See
Fyfe's works cited in note 6 supra.
13 Sherman has reported his progress in three principal items: Grant Proposal, supra note 6;
Execution Without Tial, supra note 5; and (co-authored with Langworthy) Measuring Homicide by
Police Ojters, supra note 1.
14 Sherman, Grant Proposal, supra note 6, at 44, indicates that "the racial composition of
crime bears an unknown relationship to the racial composition of arrest." On the utility of
minority arrest rates for explaining disproportionate minority shooting rates, see Harting et
al., supra note 6; Hinds, The Police Use of Excessive and Dea4'y Force: Racial Implications, in A
COMMUNITY CONCERN, supra note 1, at 7; Kobler, Robin, Takagi, supra note 6. Some com-
mentators charge that the entire criminal law and the system which administers it reflect a
White value structure which tends to disadvantage racial, ethnic, and cultural minorities. See,
e.g., Knowles & Prewitt, Racim in the Administration ofJustice, in RACE, CRIME AND JUSTICE 13
(C. Reasons & J. Kuykendall eds. 1972). Others, such as Black, The Social Organization of(Ar-
rest, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1087 (1971), argue that racial differences in arrest patterns are not the
result of officer prejudice but the product of differences in the frequency of encounters be-
[Vol. 721818
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the researchers who find the racial breakdown of arrests meaningful but
not dispositive of the issue of whether some shootings are racially moti-
vated. Such researchers are struggling to devise a researchable measure
which will be better than "violent" arrest rates or reported crime rates
for estimating the population "at risk" of being shot by police. What is
needed for this estimate is some gauge of those susceptible to being in-
volved in encounters with police, encounters which run the gamut from
traffic stops through hot pursuits of cutthroats, since any such in-
terchange potentially could involve the use of deadly force depending
on the way the officer and civilian respond to each other. The universe
of police-civilian encounters is not identical, of course, to the universe of
civilians engaged in crime, since police do not detect all criminal activity
and they do encounter many people not engaged in crimes. If we could
identify the population whose behavior makes them eligible for police
intervention, then we could study who is subjected to police intercession
and who is not, and whether the officers' decisions in these cases are
based on inappropriate considerations, such as race or cultural
characteristics.
The existing literature has a great deal to offer conceptually, but it
presents a mix of reliable and questionable portraits of police use of
deadly force. Even when providing accurate officer, civilian, and inci-
dent characteristics, very few of the studies furnish anything but the
barest detail about the interactive behaviors of the officers and civilians
involved in the deadly force incidents. Almost none probe the percep-
tions of danger held by police. This lack of detail inhibits meaningful
analysis of questions like the avoidability of shootings and possible racial
bias in the use of weapons. The generality of the data also precludes
informed questioning of existing deadly force policies. This analytic
roadblock stems from the failure of most studies to collect detailed data
relevant to the terms of police shooting policies. Such policies almost
invariably take a "situational" approach-that is, they specify certain
situations in which firearms may and may not be used. But most studies
lack sufficient detail on the situational characteristics of deadly force
incidents. It is critical that policies intended to reduce the frequency of
shooting incidents be based on an accurate understanding of the nature
of such incidents. 15 Some research efforts have indicated the kinds of
tween minorities and police and the degree of deference shown to police by members of differ-
ent racial groups during police-civilian encounters.
15 See Luckenbill, Lethal Force in Police Related Violence (June 1979) (unpublished
background paper on file at Univ. of Illinois, Chicago Circle, Dep't of Criminal Justice). See
also Luckenbill, Criminal Homicide as a Situated Transaction, 25 Soc. PROB. 176 (1977). As Fyfe
indicates, "it is not enough to know only how many police shootings occur: To intelligently
undertake social or administrative action to minimize this most extreme police-citizen vio-
lence, one must also know something about the circumstances in which it occurs." Fyfe,
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crimes civilians are allegedly engaged in when shot, and whether the
civilians were fleeing or not, but almost none have penetrated the inci-
dent enough to identify whether a fleeing civilian might be exhibiting
threatening behavior and, if so, what sort. While a few studies have
supplied information useful for examinations of policy and practice in
the jurisdictions studied, there is no assurance that any of this research is
generalizable to Chicago and its current experience with police use of
deadly force. By examining in detail the situational characteristics of
shootings in Chicago, we will attempt to construct a foundation for
thinking about the policy, training and practices which can help reduce
these shootings to an optimal level. By "optimal" we mean a level
which represents a proper balance between the safety of the officer and
the public and the rights of the criminal suspects.
The scope of our inquiry may be delineated briefly. In using the
term "deadly force," we mean only shootings. Other force which,
"under normal circumstances, poses a high risk of death or serious injury
to its human target"'16 is beyond the scope of this project. Thus, use of
the baton, spraying mace or tear gas directly in a suspect's eyes, etc.,' 7
have been excluded from this study. In addition, shots fired which fail
to hit a person-"off-target shots"-are not included, unless they oc-
curred in a police-involved incident in which someone actually suffered
a gunshot wound. Our exclusion of "misses" was solely for pragmatic
reasons associated with the added amount of work such data collection
would entail. 8 We believe strongly that the most important unit of ex-
amination for the policy maker and the community alike is the officer's
decision to pull the trigger-shots fired-regardless of whether the bul-
let finds it mark. As one commentator has put it, "woundings, off-target
shots, and fatal shootings [are] varying results of equally grave
decisions."' 9
Despite these omissions, this report still is broader in scope than
most other writing in the field. Prior studies, using coroners' informa-
Toward a Typology of Police Shootings, supra note 6, at 9-10, 15. Fyfe argues that prior
research purporting to examine the justifiability of shootings of minorities lacks the basis for
such an examination when only aggregate rates are considered. For example, "Takagi's data
on racial disproportion permit (no) assessment of the accuracy of his conclusion that police
killings are 'manifestations of racism' by police; he provides no information on the degree to
which situations justifying police shootings may be skewed among the races." Id. at 9.
16 C. MILTON, ET AL., DEADLY FORCE, supra note 5, at 41.
17 A Chicago Police Department training manual defines these as forms of deadly force.
See Police Training Institute, University of Illinois, The Police Of9er's Use of Force: Law and
Liabiliy (n.d.). Prior empirical research suggests that less than 3% of all civilians killed by
American police die by means other than firearms. See 1973 CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH
CENTER, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 194 (1973).
18 See text accompanying notes 35-40 infra.
19 Fyfe, Geographic Correlates, supra note 6, at 104.
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tion, typically have examined fatal shootings of civilians by police. Our
effort is extended on two dimensions. First, the inclusion of woundings as
well as killings of civilians has substantially enlarged the size of our data
base. Second, this study also examines shootings of police officers. We
added this second dimension for more than practical reasons associated
with gaining access to the data. We felt that one cannot properly under-
stand why police shoot civilians-and thus, how to minimize the
number of inappropriate incidents-unless one appreciates the risks of
being shot that a police officer carries with him as he enters a dark alley
or responds to another call for service. Our data set not only includes
types of incidents excluded by other researchers, but it deals with all
shootings (rather than a sample) of and by Chicago police officers over a
five year period, 1974 through 1978.
II. THE DIVERSITY OF DEADLY FORCE POLICIES AND OBSTACLES
TO COMPARING PRIOR RESEARCH FINDINGS
At the same time that it is crucial to appreciate the destructive ca-
pacity of police shootings, it is possible to forget, when dealing with a
report devoted entirely to one type of police-civilian encounter, how
many other types exist. While the visible hip holster is a constant re-
minder of the ultimate enforcement capacity of police, most police-civil-
ian encounters do not involve resort to the weapon. Researchers have
estimated that one might have to "ride along" for 80 hours in a squad
car in many cities to witness a single instance of an officer even unhol-
stering his revolver. 20 On the other hand, city-wide statistics on police
gun use can mask the fact that citizens in different communities have
vastly different exposure to this phenomenon. A researcher studying po-
lice shootings in Los Angeles dramatically characterized that city as con-
taining some neighborhoods that seemed like "sleepy hollows" and
others that amounted to "free-fire zones." While our study does not fo-
cus on shootings at the neighborhood level (mostly City-wide data are
presented), any pragmatic attempt to make headway in controlling
shootings would be remiss to ignore the fact that residents of different
parts of Chicago experience quite different "realities" regarding police
use of deadly force.
Differences exist, not only from neighborhood to neighborhood, but
also from state to state and police department to police department,
where various laws and regulations regarding police shootings are in ef-
20 Sherman, Execution Without Trial, supra note 5, at 97 n.161. Another estimate of the
prohibitive costs of such observational study suggested that "one would have to have had an
observation team the size of the patrol and detective force (700) to observe ten shootings in
Oakland in 1974." Sherman, Grant Proposal, supra note 6, at 28, based on Milton, supra note 6,
which studied police shootings in Oakland and six other cities.
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fect. Three general approaches have been adopted by the states: the
common law rule, which, among other things, permits shooting to arrest
any felony suspect (29 states);21 the 1962 Model Penal Code formula,
which permits shooting when an officer finds that a violent crime has
occurred or otherwise might ensue (12 states and the District of Colum-
bia);22 and the enumeration of certain "forcible" or "violent" felonies
which justify deadly force to arrest suspects (9 states, including
Illinois).23
Police department guidelines generally incorporate state law but
add certain additional restrictions. For example, by forbidding the un-
necessary "display" of weapons and the use of warning shots under cer-
tain conditions, the Chicago Police Department administratively
restricts officers beyond the parameters of Illinois state law.
In addition to the policies mentioned above, a number of other
model state codes or departmental guidelines have been proposed in re-
cent years, most importantly the "defense-of-life rule." This rule,
adopted by several major police departments, permits the use of force
likely to kill only when the suspect is then posing a threat of death or
serious bodily harm to the officer or another innocent person. Put an-
other way, the rule would authorize shooting to arrest by an officer who
eyewitnesses an immediate threat to life. If a state wanted to adopt this
policy, it could probably simply abolish its current law on police use of
force and retain its self-defense portion of the criminal code, which
would cover all uses of deadly force by police contemplated by the de-
fense-of-life rule.2 4 Written departmental guidelines would still be im-
21 Different commentators and courts have counted and categorized the state laws slightly
differently. The numbers given here are our best effort at amalgamation. Sources used in-
clude Sherman, Execution Without Trial, supra note 5, at 71-72; Comment, Triggering Conslitu-
tional Review, supra note 5; Note, Jusifable Use of Deadly Force by Police,supra note 5; as well as a
large number of state laws on file at the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group.
22 TASK FORCE ON THE POLICE, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 189 (1967) recommended
a similar approach, restricting shootings of escaping suspects to "perpetrators who, in the
course of their crime, threatened the use of deadly force" or to situations in which the "officer
believes there is a substantial risk that the person whose arrest is sought will cause death or
serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed." The officer, it was emphasized, has to be
"virtually certain" that the offense was committed and that the fleeing suspect committed it.
Id.
23 W. GELLER & K. KARALES, SPLIT-SECOND DECISIONS: SHOOTINGS OF AND By CHI-
CAGO POLICE 24 (1981).
24 Police officers would need to be exempted from the traditional obligation to retreat
which the self-defense doctrine imposes. See 40 Am. Jr. 2d Homicide §§ 170-71; Tsimbinos,
supra note 5; Comment, Kill or Be Killed?. Use of Deadl Force in the Riot Situation, 56 CALIF. L.
REV. 829, 834 (1968). California law, for example (which does not impose a defense-of-life
standard), specifies that "A peace officer who makes or attempts to make an arrest need not
retreat or desist from his efforts by reason of the resistance or threatened resistance ofthe person being
arrested; nor shall such o fer be deemed an aggressor or lose his right to self-dfene by the use of
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portant, however, for they communicate the state law to the officers and
typically provide useful elaboration and guidance on a number of topics
not covered by statute.
Thus, one should not expect all police departments to have the
same shooting rates, since they do not follow the same regulations. Sim-
ilarly, one should not expect studies of various police departments to
derive results which can be directly compared to one another.
In fact, not only do prior studies not afford a basis for a current
assessment of shootings of and by police in Chicago, but they generally
are not compatible with our study. Indeed, it would be harmfully mis-
leading to compare the findings of most existing police shooting studies
with those of any others, for a variety of reasons. Foremost, every such
study has its own definition of the basic unit of analysis-the use of
deadly force. To some, this means only fatal shootings by police. To
others, it means all shots fired which hit human targets, and for other
researchers it has included all discharges of the weapon. Still another
body of research comprises death, by whatever means, caused by police
officers, including, for example, use of the baton and fatal automobile
crashes during high speed chases. To make matters more difficult,'the
definition of "deadly force" being used for a given study is not always
fully explained in the published research.
On another dimension, "deadly force" has been used by some re-
searchers to refer only to line-of-duty shootings25 and by others to en-
compass all shootings by a department's officers. Some departments or
researchers will include wounds received in riots, off-duty incidents, ac-
cidental deaths, officer suicides, and instances in which a police gun was
used by a civilian against another civilian and others will omit these
cases or any combination of them from their compilations of police use
of deadly force. 26 In addition, there is a divergence of approach con-
cerning whether a shooting "counts" as a deadly force incident if it is
committed outside the jurisdiction by a member of the given city police
force. Similarly, researchers differ on whether shots fired within the city
reasonable force to effect the arrest or to prevent escape or to overcome resistance." CAL. PEN.
CODE § 835(a) (West 1976) (emphasis added).
25 Line-of-duty to some may be synonymous with "on duty," but to others it encompasses
all situations in which on- or off-duty officers are taking "police action" as opposed to becom-
ing involved in an incident as a private individual. For example, using this "police action"
approach, an armed robbery of a police officer in civilian clothes who is walking in front of
his house on personal business would be a non-line-of-duty incident, as would an intentional
shooting by an officer of his spouse. But an off-duty officer who is shopping in a grocery store
and intervenes when he notices armed bandits robbing the cashier would be acting in the
line-of-duty. See, e.g., Fyfe, Administrative Intervention, supra note 6.
26 See Sherman, Grant Proposal, supra note 6, at 22; Sherman & Langworthy, supra note 1,
at 550; C. MiLTON, ET AL., DEADLY FORCE, supra note 5, at 14.
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boundaries by members of another police agency, like the county sher-
iff's deputies or jail guards, fall within the parameters of the deadly force
data on a given city.2 7
Furthermore, if the federal government's National Center for
Health Statistics' data have been used, as they have in a number of
studies, one may face a host of problems enumerated at length in a jour-
nal article.28 For example, these data may attribute fatal shootings to
the department in a decedent's city of residence rather than to the de-
partment whose officers actually killed the person. Also, the N.C.H.S.
category of "death by legal intervention-police" may include most le-
gal killings but not all illegal killings by police. The latter arguably are
the ones policy makers need to be more aware of than the vast majority
of killings which are deemed justifiable. Some of these wrongful killings
might be lost in the stacks of incidents classed as "homicides," without
reference to legal intervention. 29 And accidental fatal shootings by po-
lice could be buried amidst the "accidental" verdicts returned by coro-
ners' juries. Neither the clearly unjustifiable nor the accidental fatal
shootings by police, therefore, would be identified as involving law en-
forcement officers. Beyond these technical questions of categorization,
Sherman and Langworthy have estimated that the N.C.H.S. data, based
not on police reports but on coroners' reports, may routinely underre-
port homicides by police by anywhere from 25% to 50%.30 The authors
note the "irony" that police shootings, which presumably pose a more
sensitive problem for police departments than for coroners, are reported
far more accurately to the public by law enforcement agencies than by
these public health officials.
A cornucopia of problems appears after a definition of "deadly
force" has been selected, for that definition is only the threshold ques-
tion in data collection and coding. Scores, and in some studies, hun-
dreds of other variables remain to be defined. Each variable-whether
it is the location type, civilian's behavior or crime which precipitated a
27 Sherman & Langworthy, supra note 1, at 551, note that researchers relying on public
health statistics for the New York City area would have no" way of knowing whether the
reported fatal shootings were done only by N.Y.P.D. personnel or both by such personnel and
by their counterparts in the Transit Authority Police, Housing Authority Police, and other
law enforcement agencies in the City. Hence, the inclusion of non-city police department
shootings in a study which purports to deal only with that department's experience is the
product not of differing intents among researchers but of their inability to control the content
of the information provided by some data sources.
28 Sherman & Langworthy, supra note 1. For a concurring view, see Meyer, sura note 6,
at 26. Similar problems have been encountered, even by government officials, trying to
match police records and state public health records on fatal shootings by police. See Bureau
of Criminal Justice Statistics supra note 6, at 2.
29 Sherman & Langworthy, supra note 1, at 549 n.24.
30 Id at 551-53, 560. See also Meyer, supra note 6, at 26.
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police shooting, degree of threat posed by a civilian, or even something
as basic as the civilian's Hispanic ethnicity-will have a discrete defini-
tion arising out of the particular characteristics of the data used. Fre-
quently, as with the basic meaning of "deadly force," the precise
definition of each variable is not supplied in the research report. This
vagueness could easily lead the reader to the erroneous belief that he
was looking at comparable factors in different studies simply because the
labels used were the same. What constitutes a defense-of-life shooting to
one researcher may be another's questionable use of deadly force, yet
both might report the percentages of civilians shot "in defense-of-life"
without further elaboration.31 Without going back to original data
sources and re-coding information using consistent definitions, one is un-
able to compare the findings of different studies.
Beyond definitional problems, a number of existing empirical stud-
ies are flawed in ways that make their findings of questionable accuracy
or statistical significance. For example, the data source, whether a news-
paper clipping or a police department's investigative files, may not fur-
nish accurate figures on the incidence of deadly force use.32 Trying to
compare rotten apples and oranges only compounds the normal difficul-
ties.33 For all these reasons, while valid comparisons can probably be
made between cities in a multi-city study,3 4 any effort to guess how Chi-
31 One researcher might consider that a civilian's threat to use-or even mere possession
of-a deadly weapon during flight classifies shots fired at him by police as defense-of-life
shots, while other researchers might place in this category only incidents involving direct or
immediate efforts by the civilian to kill the officer or another innocent person. Yet, as indi-
cated, the published research reports of both generally would not explain the background
assumptions used to place incidents in the defense-of-life category.
32 See Sherman, Grant Proposal, supra note 6, at 22; Sherman & Langworthy, supra note 1,
at 550.
33 As noted by Fyfe, Toward a Typology of Police Shootings, supra note 6, at 8-9, even if
police shootings are made comparable through the use of standard definitions, to understand
differences in shooting rates between cities one would need to consider a variety of police
organizational factors (e.g., percentage of officers assigned to street duty and the way in which
discretion not to arrest is exercised) and social variables (e.g., the degree to which the resident
population reflects the population at risk and the propensity of a city's armed criminal sus-
pects to "shoot it out" with police rather than surrender when confronted). See also Meyer,
supra note 6, at 25, which points out the importance ofjurisdictional differences between city
police departments. For example, the New York City police do not patrol that city's public
transit system, a significant source of crime. A separate transit police force of several thou-
sand officers bears that responsibility. In other cities, including Chicago, the police have
general responsibility for law enforcement on public transit facilities.
34 Attempting such a study using currently available measures of shootings by police is
discouraged on the ground that such measures "contain too much error.. . to make reliable
comparisons of specific cities. . . ." Sherman & Langworthy, supra note 1, at 547. Specifi-
cally discouraging inter-city examinations of fatal shootings, Sherman and Langworthy warn
that "[s]ince in any particular city there is a substantial likelihood that the number of police
homicides derived from any one data source is in error, comparisons of specific cities are likely
to be dangerously misleading." Id. at 559. The reliability of comparative studies by C.
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cago, as reflected in our data, "measures up" against other locales is
discouraged in the strongest terms.
III. METHODOLOGY
This is an empirical study of all shootings of and by Chicago Police
Department officers which reportedly occurred within the city limits
from January 1, 1974, through December 31, 1978.35 In addition, the
numbers of civilians shot by police during 1979 and 1980 are presented,
but no data were collected on the characteristics of these individuals or
the incidents in which they were shot. Both on- and off-duty and unin-
tentional shootings are included. Encounters in which shots were fired
at or by police but in which no person was hit are not part of our data
set.36 But misses are recorded if they were part of an incident in which
one or more bullets did hit an officer or civilian. Injuries to police or
civilians caused by means other than bullets are outside this inquiry. In
the five year period, 650 qualifying incidents occurred during which 523
civilians were shot by police and 187 police were shot by civilians, by
themselves, or by their colleagues. The civilians in this study are those
who were shot by Chicago Police and/or those who shot such officers;
the population of police officers is composed of sworn members of the
Chicago Police Department who shot orpossibly shot civilians (since it is
often difficult to attribute a "hit" to a specific officer when several fire)
and/or Chicago officers who were shot by civilians, themselves, or other
police.
This study contains recommendations for various police initiatives
to better control official use of deadly force. The efficacy of the recom-
mended control strategies depends to a large extent on the accuracy of
the data on which we have based these recommendations. The data are
MILTON, ET AL., supra note 5, R. KNOOHUIZEN, ET AL., Goldkamp, Takagi, Harding & Fa-
hey, supra note 6, is questioned by Sherman and his colleague for these reasons. Id.
35 No incidents which were reported to the Police Department needed to be excluded for
methodological reasons. Some other studies have had to exclude grossly atypical events from
their data sets lest those events skew the findings. For example, Marshall Meyer, in his recent
study of Los Angeles police shootings, dropped from his data set the May 1974 shootout
between the Symbionese Liberation Army and the Los Angeles Police Department. Meyer
explained: "More than 5,000 rounds (plus 83 tear gas canisters) were fired by Los Angeles
police officers in the S.L.A. incident, more rounds than the total fired in the remaining 912
officer-involved shootings analyzed here." Meyer, supra note 6, at 6.
36 As one commentator has noted, all shots fired by police at civilians, except for true
warning shots, involve a similar decision to employ force capable of killing. Thus, the most
accurate picture of the frequency and characteristics of these police decisions would be de-
rived from a consideration of hits as well as misses. But data on "off target" shots were not
available for this research. (Reference is made, however, to some prior research by the Chi-
cago Police Department on all shots fired over a three-year period.) See Fyfe, Shots Fired,
supra note 6, at 32.
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essentially the self-reported accounts of the shooting incidents by officers
involved in them as shooters or victims. Accordingly, "reporting bias"
may taint some portions of the data. Most of the variables we analyzed
are very likely to have been reported accurately (e.g., the age, gender,
race, and degree of injury (wounded vs. killed) of the civilian and police
participants in the shooting incidents, the officers' unit, duty status and
experience in the Department). On the other hand, some other vari-
ables may be less immune from reporting bias. For example, in filling
out the Department's mandatory "firearms use report," officers could
have exaggerated the degree of danger they felt at the time they shot a
civilian. Such exaggeration could stem from a conscious or unconscious
desire by the shooting officer to legitimize his conduct in his own mind
or to avoid discipline for a questionable shooting. Misreporting of dan-
ger could take a variety of forms, including false claims that the civilian
suspect was armed (possibly involving the use of "drop guns" 37) or that
the civilian pointed a gun or threatened to use it against the officer.
Because it was impractical for us to independently attempt to verify the
police accounts of these shootings, we have no way of knowing how
often such reporting bias may be present in our data or what patterns, if
any, it might follow--except that it almost certainly would put police
officers in a favorable light. Indeed, it would be unusual if police of-
ficers were exempt from the human tendency, exhibited by most workers
in most job settings, to try to place their own conduct in the best possible
light when under the scrutiny of their employer. While any reporting
bias is a source of concern, we are convinced that a cautious and thor-
ough examination of police records is far more enlightening and benefi-
cial to the public than a continuation of virtually complete public
ignorance on the subject of police-involved shootings. Despite any limi-
tations of scope and reliability, this data base is one of the most compre-
hensive that has been developed, and affords the public our first
panoramic look at the deadly force issue in Chicago. Further, findings
which reveal room for improvement in police practices are that much
more credible if based on data that give the benefit of the doubt to the
police.
A. DATA COLLECTION
This is an "archival" study. That is, the source material consisted
principally of written records. We made no effort to interview officers or
civilians who had been involved in the shootings, although we did talk
to police officers and community group leaders about their perceptions
of issues relating to police shootings. The data collection effort for this
37 See C. MILTON, Er AL., DEADLY FORCE, supra note 5, at 55, 74.
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study was extensive, accumulating information from the files of five
agencies spread over eight different geographically separated offices.
We sought and obtained information on police-involved shootings from
each of the agencies, other than the Police Department, which exercised
any sort of review over such incidents and would, therefore,.be likely to
have archival information. These agencies included the offices of the
Cook County State's Attorney, the Cook County Medical Examiner,
and the Chicago Police Board. In addition, we researched newspaper
clipping files at the Municipal Reference Library. Once the Police De-
partment opened its files to us, we discovered that most of the files re-
viewed at other agencies were repetitive of, but less comprehensive than,
the Department's records. We attempted to minimize repetitious data
gathering by setting up tally sheets to show what kinds of information
were still needed in specific cases. We found a vast amount of new infor-
mation in the Department's records which, combined with our decision
to add an additional year (1978) of shootings to the study, presented an
imposing data collection task.
Data collection was accomplished with the use of a form which con-
tained both "closed" and "open-ended" questions. We revised and ex-
panded the data form three times. These revisions were prompted by
the discovery, in records of the other agencies, of Police Department
forms specifying response categories and types of information which
seemed to us potentially useful for an understanding of shootings of and
by police.
The Chicago Police Department provided the best data source-
the Department's internal investigative files (also referred to below as
the O.P.S./I.A.D. files). These records furnished the most consistently
complete picture of the deadly force incident. 38 Unlike most of our
other sources mentioned above, these files painted a detailed portrait of
both the incident scenarios and the participants' characteristics. (As in-
dicated earlier, the information contained in these records, like the in-
formation contained in other documents mentioned in this section, may
be subject to varying degrees of "reporting bias." It would have been
impractical for us to independently verify the information contained in
police reports on the shootings. Thus, this study describes and analyzes
police shootings as they have been officially reported.)
For the incidents within our study which occurred prior to Septem-
ber 1974, the Internal Affairs Division (I.A.D.) files were utilized. The
I.A.D. is a unit of the Police Department responsible for investigating
38 These files were not available for some 1978 shootings, which were still under investiga-
tion or review at the time of data collection. Less extensive data were available for those
shootings from some of the other sources indicated below in the text.
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alleged misconduct by members of the Department. Until September
1974, investigations of shootings by police fell under its jurisdiction. In
that month, the Office of Professional Standards (O.P.S.) was instituted
to examine, among other things, citizen complaints of police excessive
force and all shootings by police, whether or not a citizen lodged a com-
plaint. (I.A.D. still retained a considerable caseload pertaining to other
kinds of alleged police impropriety.) Unlike the I.A.D., O.P.S. is staffed
entirely by civilians and is intended to be relatively independent of the
Department's command structure. Although the organization and pro-
cedures of O.P.S. and the pre-1975 I.A.D. are certainly distinct, the files
generated by both offices can be discussed interchangeably for the pur-
poses of this report, since the relevant data were quite similar.
Typical information on the disposition of the involved officers'
cases would consist of the decision of the Cook County State's Attorney's
Special Prosecutions Bureau on prosecution of these officers; the recom-
mendation of O.P.S. or I.A.D. on whether to discipline the officer; the
punishment, if any, meted out by the Department; a "second opinion"
from the Chicago Commission on Human Relations concerning the va-
lidity of the O.P.S. or I.A.D. finding; and the results of any Police Board
hearings connected with the case.
Several incident summaries, each somewhat repetitive of the others,
were contained in the files. These summaries were prepared by O.P.S.
staff, the participant officers and their superiors. The participant of-
ficer's report of the incident was found in a number of places, including
two documents discussed below: the Firearms Use Report and, if in-
cluded among the records in the O.P.S. file, the statement taken by the
State's Attorney's office. Characteristics and behaviors of the civilian(s)
involved were also recorded in numerous reports within the
O.P.S./I.A.D. file.
Some of the data available in this file, but not in some of the other
sources used, are the type of weapon used by the civilian and whether it
was recovered; criminal background; number of shots fired by the civil-
ian(s); information on which hospital the civilian was taken to, who
transported him, and his condition after arrival. In addition, we found
the usual information found in other sources-civilian's age, sex, race,
home address, etc.-although these items were found more consistently
in the O.P.S./I.A.D. files than elsewhere.
The form most instrumental in furnishing information on officer
and incident characteristics which was unavailable from sources other
than the Police Department was the Firearms Use Report. Such a form
must be filled out for each incident in which an officer discharges his
weapon, with limited exceptions not relevant to this study. Some of the
key elements of this report not contained in other documents are: the
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distance between the officer and the civilian when the officer fired his
first and last shots; whether the officer had to sight and aim; number of
shots fired and whether they were "single" or "double" action firings;
the protective cover, if any, used; an explanation as to why the officer
used his gun ("protect self," "prevent flight or escape of felon," etc.);
and a description of the weapon used by the officer. Other information
in the O.P.S./I.A.D. file not always obtainable through other reports
includes the lighting conditions at the scene and the unit and beat as-
signments of the involved officers.
Data on shootings of officers, were acquired through the Police De-
partment, but not from O.P.S. files, which, as noted, are only created for
shootings by police. The records used for shootings of officers were hos-
pitalization case reports, "supplementary reports," and officer "battery
and assault files," among others. These reports are based primarily on
the results of homicide officers' investigations.
Gaps in officer-related information which remained after our ex-
haustive review of the records previously mentioned and those of other
agencies were partially filled by the Department's own data collection
efforts using personnel files. That is, we supplied tally sheets to the De-
partment indicating which information was unavailable for certain
cases in the records we had searched, and the Department supplied the
missing information from personnel files (to which we were not privy).
The kind of information generally obtained through this process in-
cluded officers' race, date of birth, and date of appointment to the
Department.
B. CODING, DATA RETRIEVAL AND ANALYSIS
Coding was accomplished with the use of a "codebook" which we
developed based on the information contained in our data forms. One
form was completed for each case. Information obtained in answer to
open-ended questions, such as narrative descriptions of the police-civil-
ian interactions, had to be placed in discrete categories. Our coding
system was designed to capture as much of the data as possible.
Six staff members, including the authors, participated in coding the
data. The coders were carefully trained in the use of our "codebook,"
and quality control was exercised both through close supervision and by
having only the authors code questions which called for subjective
judgments.
Not all the data we collected and would have liked to code could be
coded given the press of time and budgetary constraints. (Not all the
data coded could be analyzed for similar reasons.) We created three
1830 [Vol. 72
CHICAGO POLICE SHOOTINGS
basic kinds of variables: incident-, civilian- and officer-specific. 39 The
total number of variables coded for each case varied, depending on the
number of participants. For every shooting incident, we coded a set
number of variables concerning incident characteristics (when, where,
etc.) plus a set number of variables on the characteristics and behaviors
of up to three civilians and up to four officers who were involved. In an
incident with three civilian and four officer participants, more than 400
variables would be coded, while a "one-on-one" shooting would require
the coding of fewer variables. The nature of the variables coded was
determined after a review of the literature and examination of classifica-
tions used by the Chicago Police Department on various reporting forms
(e.g., Firearms Use Report, Officer Battery and Assault Report).
The principal analytic techniques relied upon in this study were
cross tabulations and correlations. Time and resources did not permit
us to conduct multivariate analyses. We would strongly urge that such
analyses be run in the future, especially in relation to the race issue and
the variables which might help explain variations in shootings over
time, to the extent that the data permit. Multivariate statistical tech-
niques might help to distinguish among the host of variables which
could determine the nature and rate of shooting incidents. The simple
cross tabs we have produced are an important prerequisite to mul-
tivariate analysis because they permit the researcher to think about the
possible impact of each separate variable on shootings. Multivariate
analysis, as a next step in the research, may permit more confident con-
clusions. In addition, because multivariate analysis eliminates the need
to present each factor related to a key variable (such as race) separately
in sequence, such analysis permits a more compact presentation of the
data.
We performed some tests of statistical significance in order to judge
the strength of the relationships we found between variables. Techni-
cally, these tests are designed to help the researcher judge whether or not
the relationships found for a sample of cases are sufficiently strong to
conclude that the same pattern of relationship can be expected to exist
in the large population of cases from which this sample was drawn. For
this study, we are not really interested in generalizing relationships from
sample to population data since we were already examining the entire
39 The term "civilians" encompasses the full range of individuals from crime suspects to
clearly innocent victims of accidental shootings. Actor-specific information profiles the indi-
vidual civilian and police shooters and shooting victims. The incident-specific approach fo-
cuses on the situations in which police bullets struck one or more civilians and situations in
which either civilian or police bullets struck one or more officers. Thus, "incidents" are occur-
rences of shootings, some involving multiple participants. The number of incidents is not
equal to the number of persons who were shot or who shot others.
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population of cases for the 1974 to 1978 period. Nonetheless, if statisti-
cal significance is found, the relationship may be sufficiently strong to
persuade the researcher to infer (if other sorts of evidence so warrant) a
causal connection between the variables. The reader should be aware,
however, that the number of cases involved (and not just the magnitude
of the differences between cells) has a marked effect on tests of statistical
significance. Thus, differences between cells, which are not statistically
significant with the small number of cases we have in this study, would
be statistically significant if large numbers were involved.40 For this rea-
son, the reader needs to be cautious about the lack of statistical signifi-
cance found in some of our tables. Causal relationships may still exist.
We have, therefore, pursued discussion of various relationships despite
the lack of statistical significance.
IV. SHOOTING TYPES
The circumstances in which Chicago police shot 523 civilians from
1974 through 1978 are distributed as indicated by Figure 1. This figure
depicts the reasons the officers gave their superiors for firing shots which
struck civilians. These reasons typically described the civilians' alleged
conduct just prior to the shooting (e.g., use or threatened use of a gun,
flight to evade arrest, etc.). 41 In the cases of unintentional shootings,
however, descriptions of officer mistakes or involuntary actions were of-
fered to explain the shootings. Several definitions are important for an
understanding of the different shooting types. All the shootings except
for "accidental," "mistaken I.D." and "stray bullet" were intentional.
"Intentional" shootings are those where the officer accurately under-
stood whom he was shooting (not necessarily by name, but by role, such
as "crime suspect" or "spouse") and voluntarily shot this person. The
three types of unintentional shootings are defined as follows. Accidental
shootings are those in which the officer did not mean to pull the trigger.
In mistaken identity shootings, the officer meant to shoot the person but
inaccurately perceived the victim's role or identity. Stray bullet inci-
dents are those where the officer meant to discharge the weapon but not
40 We have used a rather traditional social science approach to analyze our data, mindful
that the small number of cases involved imposes limitations for such an analysis. A longer
time period or a population base larger than that available in studying a single city would
have provided more traditional size "Ns" for social science analysis. To paraphrase Church-
ill's characterization of democracy, our social science approach to analyzing these data is the
worst possible approach, except for all the alternatives.
41 It should be noted that these types do not represent the various kinds of incidents which
init'ally prompted officers to become involved. Indeed, our types cut across these reasons for
involvement. For example, an encounter which ended with a shooting precipitated by the
civilian's use of a gun on officers may have commenced with a call of "armed robbery in
progress," "man with a gun" or with an off-duty officer's involvement in a personal dispute.
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to hit the person who was shot. Shots intended as warning shots which
hit a person are included among the stray bullet shootings. As these
definitions indicate, mistaken identity and stray bullet shootings are
both unanticipated consequences of the decision to pull the trigger,




17 StrayOther deadly weapon or




TYPOLOGY: REASONS GIVEN BY POLICE FOR SHOOTING
CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978
(n = 523 Civiliansshot)
A. INTENTIONAL SHOOTINGS
(1) "Gun use/threat" (type 1)
By far the most frequent reason given by police for shootings is a
civilian's use or threatened use of a gun. More than half of all civilians
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shot by police (264) were reportedly engaged in such conduct when shot.
The category "gun use/threat," as well as most of the other shooting
types, was derived by combining several, more specific reasons which
officers frequently gave for shooting. "Gun use/threat" comprises the
following categories of reported civilian conduct, with the numbers and
percentages of all civilians shot for these reasons indicated:
(a) Civilian shot officer or another
(b) Civilian fired gun at officer or another,
but missed
(c) Civilian lunged at officer or officer's
gun
(d) Civilian attempted to use a gun against
officer or another
(e) Civilian appeared to point or did point
a gun at officer or another
() Civilian threatened to use a gun against
officer or another
(g) Civilian moved in a way that made
officer think he was about to draw or
use a weapon
(h) Civilian appeared to display a gun











Categories (e) and (h) above, as well as some of the categories asso-
ciated with other shooting types, include officers who shot in response to
seeing "dark" or "shiny" objects. In some cases, these objects turned out
to be guns. In others, however, the objects were subsequently discovered
to be combs, tire irons, sunglasses, and the like. Sixteen of the civilian
shooting victims whom police reportedly thought were armed with a
gun at the time of the shooting were not so armed, as revealed by later
investigation, and most of these 16 shootings were of the "dark" or
"shiny" object variety. While guns were reportedly recovered from the
vast majority of the civilian shooting victims who were shot because of
alleged use of a gun, we cannot independently verify these reports (just
as we cannot independently confirm any of the other information we
recorded from source documents). Accordingly, our data do not permit
us to address the topic of "drop guns," a term which signifies the plant-
ing of a gun on a shooting victim to make a questionable shooting or
other police action appear justified.43
42 Does not total to 100% because of rounding.
43 See C. MILTON, ET AL., DEADLY FORCE, supra note 5, at 55, 74. See text accompanying
notes 35-40 supra for additional discussion of possible "reporting bias" in our data.
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(2) "Other dead.y weapon or physicalforce use/threat" (type 2)
Seventy-two civilians (14%) were shot by police for either using or
threatening to use a deadly weapon other than a gun or for using or
threatening to use physical force.44 The kinds of conduct encompassed
within Type 2 shootings are diverse in some ways, but share the com-
mon feature that they can be life-threatening at close range. "Other
deadly weapons" include knives, broken glass, motor vehicles if used as
weapons, and any other object normally capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury. Like the previous type, "other deadly weapon or
physical force use/threat" was derived through the combination of sev-
eral kinds of reported precipitating conduct:
Number Percentage
(a) Civilian used a deadly weapon other
than a gun against officer or another 7 10%
(b) Civilian struggled or fought without a
weapon with officer or another 5 7
(c) Civilian attempted to use a deadly
weapon other than a gun against officer
or another 51 71
(d) Civilian appeared to point a deadly
weapon other than a gun at officer or
another 2 3
(e) Civilian appeared to point an unknown
object at officer or another 5 7
(f) During flight, civilian suddenly stopped
and turned toward officer in a
menacing manner 2 3
Total 72 100
The extent to which these various behaviors left the officer with
options depends on the facts of specific cases, some of which the data
address and some of which they do not. Some of the facts one might
need to know, for example, to determine whether a shooting was neces-
sary to protect life, are whether a knife-wielding suspect was within
striking distance of the officer or another person and whether the officer
had availed himself of any possible cover.
44We have combined use and threats to use deadly weapons other than guns with physi-
cal force in our Type 2 shootings for two reasons. First, fists can be just as deadly as weapons
other than guns, depending on the relative size and strength of the civilian and the officer and
other factors. Second, there is always the possibility that the kind of civilian who is not afraid
to physically attack an armed police officer could disarm the officer. The use or threat to use
guns is separated out in Type 1 because those threats or uses can be meaningful at long
distance, while Type 2 shootings share the common feature that they are responses to threats
or force which can be life-threatening only within "grabbing" distance.
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(3) "Other deadly weapon possessed without threat" (type 3)
Twelve more civilians (2%) were shot for allegedly possessing a
deadly weapon other than a gun without attempting to use it at the time
of the shooting. In some cases, the officer apparently had reason to be-
lieve the weapon played a key part in the civilian's recent commission of
a crime, and in others the officer seemingly had little basis for drawing
such a conclusion. A number of the Type 3 incidents, like some of the
Type 1 (gun use/threat) incidents, include "dark" or "shiny" objects
which officers reportedly believed to be guns or knives. Two types of
precipitating conduct combine to produce this third category of shoot-
ings, as indicated below:
Number Percentage
(a) Civilian appeared to display an
unknown object without pointing it 5 42%
(b) Civilian appeared to possess an
unknown concealed object 7 58
Total 12 100
(4) 'Wight without other resistance" (type 4)
Probably the most widely debated element of deadly force policy in
America is that which permits police to shoot at fleeing civilians who
may have committed a serious offense but whose only resistance to arrest
at the time of the shooting is flight. This category, the second largest,
includes 89 civilians (17% of all victims) shot by Chicago police. Of-
ficers' reports indicated that these civilians were shot when offering no
resistance to arrest other than flight. It is noteworthy that every one of
these 89 civilians was reportedly thought to be fleeing from a forcible
felony,45 a key statutory condition justifying such a shooting.46 Not all
such shootings were deemed justifiable under Chicago Police Depart-
ment guidelines. In one well-publicized incident, for example, an officer
was fired after the Department found he had shot a young fleeing bur-
glary suspect without attempting other means of capture (chase, etc.)
prior to shooting.47 But the vast majority of the "forcible fleeing felon
shootings" were found justifiable by the Department, a result consistent
45 Under Illinois law, forcible felonies are defined as "treason, murder, voluntary man-
slaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping, aggravated battery, and any other fel-
ony which involved the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual."
ILL. RE V. STAT. ch. 38, 1 2-8 (1979). See also id. at 5-7, "Peace Officer's Use of Force in
Making Arrest."
46 No independent verification of the officers' reports was feasible, and reporting bias may
taint this finding.
47 After court review of the Department's decision, the officer was reinstated.
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with the fact that officers are trained to shoot, if necessary, to prevent
the escape of persons suspected of forcible felonies.
The array of forcible felonies which officers reportedly suspected
these 89 civilians of running from is indicated in Table 1. Burglary is
the crime most often associated in the media and the public mind with
so-called "fleeing felon" shootings, and Table 1 verifies the accuracy of
that perception. Close behind burglary, with 32% of all "fleeing" vic-
tims, is the combination of armed and strong arm robbery.
TABLE 1
FORCIBLE FELONIES WHICH POLICE SUSPECTED WHEN
THEY SHOT FLEEING CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO,
1974-1978
CIVILIANS SHOT IN FLIGHT
SUSPECTED FORCIBLE FELONY # %
Rape 2 2%




Assault/Aggravated Battery 16 18%
Total 89 100%
(5) "Other reasons for shooting intentionally" (type 5)
Seven civilians (2%) were shot intentionally for reasons other than
the preceding four types. These included wrongful shootings, in which
the civilian's conduct was not the precipitating factor or at least not
considered a justifying factor by the Department. That is, these civil-
ians were shot neither in self-defense nor for purposes of apprehension.
Also included among these seven cases are shootings in which civilians
who were facing away from responding officers but not fleeing were shot
when they turned towards officers in manners that could not reasonably
be described as menancing. Officer nervousness may have played a role
in the few shootings of this latter kind.
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B. UNINTENTIONAL SHOOTINGS (TYPES 6-8)
As Figure 1 shows, "accidental" shootings (Type 6) are clearly the
modal type of unintentional shooting by police, 48 accounting for 7 1% of
all civilians shot unintentionally. Overall, 10% of all civilians (52) shot
by Chicago police were shot by officers who reportedly did not intend to
pull the trigger.49 Only four (1%) civilians were reportedly shot as a
result of mistaken identity (Type 7) over the five years studied. Seven-
teen civilians (3%) were struck by "stray bullets" (Type 8)-bullets in-
tended for other targets or no targets at all (warning shots).
The preceding three types of unintentional shootings have three
characteristics in common. First, female victims, who are approxi-
mately 6% of all civilians shot by police, represent 16% of the civilians
shot unintentionally. Another and perhaps more striking way to put
this is that 41% of all females who are hit by police bullets are shot
unintentionally, while only 13% of male civilian victims fall into this
category. The disproportionate involvement of women and girls as vic-
tims of gun-cleaning and other non-confrontational gun discharges
helps explain this pattern. Second, juveniles (under 18 years old), who
are 17% of those shot, regardless of the shooting officers' intent, account
for 27% of the civilians shot unintentionally. This variation is at least
partially accounted for by the fact that all of the civilian victims 13
years of age or under were shot unintentionally. Of the 71 civilian vic-
tims of unintentional shootings whose ages were ascertained, 27% were
under 18, 13% were between 18 and 20 years old, 27% were between 21
and 24, 31% were between 25 and 44, and 3% were over 45 years old.
50
Third, a clear pattern emerges regarding the role of civilians shot unin-
tentionally by the police. Only 58% of such civilians were crime suspects
(as distinguished from innocent bystanders, crime victims, etc.), while
97% of the civilians reportedly shot intentionally were suspected of a
crime.
V. DEGREE OF INJURY AND SHOOTING TYPES
The eight shooting types set forth above involve qualitatively differ-
48 As indicated previously, accidental shootings are a specific type of unintentional event.
49 Conversations with police consultants suggested that some percentage of shootings
listed as accidental are in fact intentional shootings. These are, reportedly, incidents which
the shooting officers feel their superiors might not view as justifiable. Hence, the officers
report the incidents as accidental in the hope of avoiding the serious penalties that might
attend the Department's finding that an intentional shooting was improper. The possibility of
self-serving reporting bias, as indicated in the methodology section of the text, supra, applies
to all categories of shootings in our typology.
50 These age ranges were used for convenience because they conform to the ranges re-
ported by the Chicago Police Department for arrestees.
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ent kinds of behavior by both civilians and police and, accordingly, are
useful for analyzing both outcomes of shootings and the characteristics
of the participants. The most important direct outcome of a shooting is
whether the person shot lives to stand trial for alleged offenses or dies.
Table 2 indicates the degree of injury of civilians shot in each type of
shooting. This table shows that different "fatality rates" coincide with
TABLE 2
CIVILIANS SHOT BY POLICE IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978:
DEGREE OF INJURY AND SHOOTING TYPESa
DEGREE OF INJURY OF CIVILIANS SHOT
BY POLICE
SHOOTING TYPE Wounded Killed % Killed Total
(1) Gun use/threat 179 85 32% 264
(2) Other deadly weapon or
physical force use/threat 50 22 31% 72
(3) Other deadly weapon pos-
sessed without threat 9 1 10% 10
(4) Flight w/o other resistance 77 10 12% 87
(5) Other reasons for shooting
intentionally 2 1 33% 3
(6) Accidental 44 8 15% 52
(7) Mistaken Identity 3 1 25% 4
(8) Stray Bullet 15 2 12% 17
Total 379 130 26% 509b
a Using the X2 test of significance for all types of shootings shown in the table, there are
significant differences at the .05 level.
b Not ascertained = 14.
different shooting types. A number of factors are likely51 explanations:
differential shooting accuracy and numbers of shots fired under different
circumstances, as well as differential intents to kill based on the officer's
perception of danger to his own or someone else's life. Civilians reported
to have been in direct confrontations with officers at the time of the
51 Further analysis, which we were unable to conduct due to time constraints, would very
likely help make some of these conclusions more confident. For example, one might find it
productive to examine the shooting types according to the frequency with which civilians in




shooting (Types 1 and 2) had the greatest chance of dying following the
incident.52 Approximately one-third of these civilians died from their
wounds. But civilians shot in flight were approximately one-third as
likely to die. And civilians shot accidentally were half as likely as those
shot in confrontations to succumb to their wounds.53 The greater diffi-
culty involved in shooting at a moving target at relatively great dis-
tances seems a likely explanation for the higher survival rate of fleeing
suspects, while accidental shooting results probably stem from the fact
that the vast majority of such incidents involve only one, unaimed shot.
Similarly, the 12% fatality rate for victims of stray bullets probably re-
sults from the fact that officers were not attempting to hit the person
struck.54 While the numbers associated with shooting Type 3 ("other
deadly weapon possessed without threat") in Table 2 are too small to
support confident conclusions, the low percentage of civilians killed
when shot for possessing but not using a weapon other than a gun is
consistent with the hypothesis that police perceive these situations as le~s
dangerous than shooting Types 1 or 2 (use or threat to use a gun or.-
other deadly weapon) and exercise their discretion by firing fewer times
in the less threatening cases.
Since police have at least some degree of discretion whether and
how often to shoot in many situations, one logically wonders about what
factors guide that discretion. Of particular concern is whether police
shooting decisions are made for inappropriate reasons, such as the race
of the civilians involved. We cannot, on the basis of the written records
from which our data were obtained, know what specific officers were
thinking when they fired their weapons. The next step, accordingly, is
to search for patterns which would be consistent or inconsistent with
racial motivation on the part of shooting officers.
52 The number of civilians involved in Type 5 shootings is too small to yield reliable
results.
53 The low fatality rate for civilians shot accidentally is not consistent over time. All of
the civilians who died from accidentally inflicted wounds were shot in 1975 and 1977. Thus,
with no accidental killings in 1974 or 1976, the concentration of such incidents in 1975 and
1977 had a significant community impact. The 1977 shootings, in particular, received a high
degree of publicity and brought the Chicago Police Department a great deal of criticism
because the half dozen incidents all occurred within a four or five month period and involved
youthful victims.
54 Notwithstanding this probable explanation, one should not overstate the capacity of
police officers--or others-to shoot the standard police revolver with great accuracy under
street conditions. A more in-depth discussion of this statement will follow in Part II of this
article, which will appear in the Spring, 1982, issue of this publication.
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VI. RACE AND OTHER KEY VARIABLES IN SHOOTINGS OF
CIVILIANS
Approximately 20% (105) of the civilians shot by Chicago police
over the five years studied were white, 70% (358) were black, and 10%
(51) were Hispanic.5 5 Minorities, therefore, accounted for 80% of all
shooting victims. The 1970 Census reported that whites were approxi-
mately 60% of Chicago's resident population. Blacks were 33% and His-
panics were 7.5%. Updated estimates suggest that the racial distribution
of Chicago's population has shifted to 47% white, 41% black, and 12%
Hispanic.5 6 By either of these measures, black civilians were shot by
police in a disproportionate number of incidents, although the disparity
among the rates is somewhat smaller when the updated estimates are
used. In this section, we will attempt to explore the reasons for this dis-
proportion using two main devices: (1) comparison of shooting data to
contextual factors, like population figures, arrest statistics, and the racial
composition of the Chicago police force; and (2) detailed examination of
our data to check for racially-linked patterns.5 7
A. RACE, POPULATION AND ARRESTS
The purpose of comparing the numbers of civilians shot to popula-
55 The race/ethnicity (hereinafter "race") of nine civilians was not ascertainable from
source documents.
56 Chicago Tribune, May 18, 1980, § 2, at I, col. 1. Rev. Jorge Morales, an Hispanic
leader in Chicago, was quoted in the Chicago Sun-Times, October 25, 1978, § 1, at 16, col. 1,
with an estimate that Hispanics were at least 15% of Chicago's population. It should be
emphasized that the discussion of population figures in this section necessarily assumes, al-
most certainly incorrectly, that the size of Chicago's resident population did not change dur-
ing the five years studied. Yearly population estimates were not easily accessible to us,
however, so the figures presented are all approximate.
57 We tread delicately in this sensitive area of possible racism, aware that our data, like
most social science research findings, at best convey only an imperfect version of broad pat-
terns of behavior and may bear little relation to specific experiences which individuals have
had with police officers. Two major caveats concerning our analysis in this section must be
noted at the outset. The first is that multivariate statistical techniques could not be employed
because of time and resource constraints. The second caveat is that our data contain only the
police accounts of the shooting incidents. While there is little reason to expect that police
reports would be inaccurate in recording the race or ethnicity of civilians shot or the police
who shot them, we have no way to be sure that the course of conduct reported by police to
have preceded the shootings occurred exactly as reported. In most cases, the police reports
from which our data were collected provided a general description of the chain of events
which culminated in a shooting, but lacked the kind of "step-by-step" detail on more subtle
elements of the interaction between civilian and officer (body language, tone of voice with
which statements were made, presence of bystanders and their conduct, if any, which affected
the police-civilian encounter) which one might wish for in an attempt to check for racial
motivations behind shootings. These data are used because they are the best information
available to date concerning police shootings in Chicago. In any event, this report should be
considered only one, necessarily inconclusive step toward identifying the role race may play in
police shootings.
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tion or arrest figures or to any other numbers is to try to find a standard
against which to determine whether race plays a role in shooting inci-
dents. Put simply, when someone comments, "An awful lot of blacks are
shot by police," one may reasonably inquire, "Compared to what?"
Obviously, every shooting victim is one too many, but that realization
does not take us very far toward understanding whether one racial
group is experiencing more shootings than could be expected or is exper-
iencing shootings of a type which raise questions about racism.
One could argue that in a perfectly egalitarian society, no social
configurations, including the distribution of police shooting victims,
would show any racial disproportions. Thus, in such a setting, if blacks
were 45% of the population, they would be 45% of the college graduates,
45% of the artists, 45% of the corporate executives, and 45% of the shoot-
ing victims. In a society with no racial bias, a deviation in any area
from the population distribution would be explainable by chance or by
factors other than skin color. In our less than perfect society, one under-
standably wonders whether racism is a contributing factor when any
racial groups are significantly over- or under-represented among the
"haves" or the "have nots." Such an inquiry seems entirely appropriate
in this study since less than half the city population is black but 70% of
those shot by police are black.
Arrest rates may help explain the wide disparity between the racial
distribution of Chicago's population and the racial distribution of civil-
ian victims of police shootings. Arrest encounters have been used by
other researchers5 8 to approximate the number of situations in which
police and civilians have the physical opportunity, because they are in
each other's presence to become involved in situations that could result
in one shooting the other. To be sure, police and civilians have many
encounters for every one that results in an arrest, but, arguably, one can
estimate the total number of encounters based on the number of ar-
rests. 59 We, too, have analyzed our data using arrest statistics in this
fashion, but with somewhat less confidence6O that variations in the
number of arrests produce variations in the number of shootings. We
have used arrest data as a standard for lack of better alternative stan-
dards against which to measure the racial distribution of shooting vic-
tims. Additionally, it seems correct to expect that the chances of having
shootings occur would vary with increases or decreases in the number of
58 See, e.g., C. MILTON, ET AL., DEADLY FORCE, supra note 5, Fyfe, Shots Fired, supra note 6.
59 This assumption is subject to the objection that police may be more likely to arrest
blacks than whites for similar conduct. For example, it could be that blacks commit 60% of
all serious crimes, but, due to discriminatory behavior by police, are 70% of those arrested.
Future researchers may find it helpful to examine victimization surveys to clarify this point.
60 See, e.g., Fyfe, Shots Fired, supra note 6.
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arrest encounters. (This logic derives from our finding that most shoot-
ings reportedly occur in connection with forcible felonies.) Our doubts
about the relationship between arrests and shootings are set forth follow-
ing a presentation of the data.
Table 3 reports these data. It shows the average annual rates61 at
which civilians were shot by police based on two population and two
arrest figures. The population statistics used are from the 1970 Census
and updated estimates reported in the press. The arrest figures used are
(1) arrests for "forcible felonies," which in Illinois are the offenses
(crimes of personal violence plus burglary) whose suspects police officers
may legally shoot, under certain circumstances, to prevent their escape;
and (2) arrests for "all offenses," ranging from murder through petty
larceny. Only traffic violations are excluded from the latter category.
The category of "forcible felony arrests" arguably should present a
much better 62 basis than "all arrests" for estimating the "population at
risk"--those civilians whose interactions with police are serious enough
that they reasonably have a potential to result in shootings. It should be
noted that Table 3 compares the numbers of civilians shot to external
factors-population and arrest figures-without illuminating the cir-
cumstances in which civilians of different races or ethnicities were shot.
That inquiry will follow this one.
Table 3 suggests that, based on our best indicator of the population
at risk (forcible felony arrests), whites are slightly more likely to be shot
by police than are blacks or Hispanics. Using statistical tests, however,
we found that the differences in the "forcible felony" column rates are
not significant. The rate differences may still be indicative of important
differences 63 (even though the numbers are too small to produce statisti-
cally significant findings). The other three columns in Table 3 report
rates which have been of some interest to prior researchers but which we
will mention only in passing because we do not feel that they are based
on conceptually adequate indicators of the population at risk. The far
61 All rates relating to the race of civilians or police.officers in this report are calculated
using figures for the number of persons of the indicated race in the base. For example, a rate
concerning the number of white officers who shot civilians per 1,000 white officers on the
police force is calculated using not the total number of police officers but the total number of
white officers in the base.
62 Neither arrest nor population data are the ideal basis for estimating the population at
risk, but none better have been found. Recommendations for future research follow in Part II
of this article. Although our analysis only discusses forcible felony arrests, Table 3 includes
data on "all arrests" because the reader may be interested in considering "all arrests" as a
surrogate for all police-civilian encounters. For our purposes, a surrogate for all potentially
violent police-civilian encounters is more suitable.
63 If the rates do represent important differences in the chances which civilians of different
races have of being shot by police, the disparity may be due partially to the disproportionate
number of whites who are shot accidentally, as suggested below in connection with Table 6.
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right hand column reveals that whites are somewhat less likely than
blacks or Hispanics to be shot by police per 10,000 civilians of the indi-
cated race who are arrested for any offense-including petty crimes.
This comparison is conceptually weak, however, because it is not very
likely that the population in serious jeopardy of being shot by police
includes very many persons whose encounters with police concern only
petty offenses. The population-based rates, as would be expected, sug-
gest a fairly wide disparity in shooting rates among the races (blacks are
either 3.8 or 6.6 times more likely than whites to be shot by police de-
pending upon the population figure used.64) It must be remembered,
TABLE 3
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES AT WHICH POLICE SHOT
CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978,
BY VICTIMS' RACE
AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF CIVILIANS SHOT:
Per 100,000
RACE OF population- Per 100,000 Per 1,000 for- Per 10,000 ar-
CIVILIANS 1970 population- cibile felony rests for "all
SHOT Census updateda arrestsb offenses Tc
White 1.0 1.4 5.6 2.9
Black 6.6 5.3 4.5 3.8
Hispanicd  4.1 2.6 4.3 3.6
Total 3.2 e 4.7f 3.6
a Based on population estimates reported in Chicago Tribune, May 18, 1980.
b Forcible felony arrests include arrests for murder, rape, armed and strong arm robbery,
aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and burglary.
c All arrests by the Chicago Police Department are included, from murder through petty
larceny. Only arrests for traffic violations are excluded. Source: Chicago Police Depart-
ment annual statistical summaries.
d Population and arrest figures for Hispanics are estimated since neither the 1970 Census
nor Chicago Police Department statistical reports adequately specify a "Hispanic" cate-
gory. Census Bureau staff and staff from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights aided in
estimating Hispanic population figures. Chicago Police Department reports have catego-
ries for white, black, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and "other" races. After consultation
with Police Department statisticians, we determined that the "other" category could be
used as a rough surrogate measure for Hispanic arrestees. Some Hispanics may be in-
cluded in the white category and some non-Hispanics may be included in the "other"
category ofarrestees. The race of the shooting victims was not estimated, however. Police
records specified whether the individuals were white, black, Puerto Rican, Mexican or
otherwise.
e No revised estimate of the total population was indicated in the source used for updated
population figures--Chicago Tribune, May 18, 1980.
f Using a standard "Z" test for equality of proportions, none of the differences between the
rates in this column are statistically significant at the .05 level.
64 The disparity between the likelihood of blacks and whites being shot based on their
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however, that the general population is not a good indicator of the pop-
ulation at risk of being shot, and while the rates based on total popula-
tion are perhaps of general interest, they do not provide the proper
context needed to examine racial issues in the data.
A slightly different perspective can be gained on the arrest-shooting
comparison by looking beyond only those shooting incidents in which
persons were struck by bullets. We have considered data not collected
by the Study Group but compiled by the Chicago Police Department
some years ago and made available to us. These data pertain to all
civilians fired at by Chicago police, whether or not the civilians were
struck by the bullets. These data span a three-year period, 1975 through
1977, and reveal that approximately 17% (236) of those fired at by Chi-
cago police were white, 75% (1,074) were black, and 9% (125) were His-
panic.65 The Police Department's figures on persons fired upon by
police are presented in Table 4.
Table 4 suggests that, based on forcible felony arrests, blacks are
slightly more likely than whites to be fired upon by police, while His-
panics are somewhat less likely than whites or blacks to be fired at.
However, with the exception of the black-Hispanic disparity, the differ-
ences in rates are not statistically significant. As was the case with Table
3, the "all offenses" column and the general population columns in Ta-
ble 4 suggest that blacks and Hispanics are more likely than whites to be
fired upon by police, but the rates in these columns are not considered
realistic reflections of the chances that persons in serious confrontations
with police have of being shot. (Again, they are reported here only in
passing because of widespread prior interest in these kinds of rates.)
Considering Tables 3 and 4 together, we find that, with one excep-
tion,66 civilians of different races face approximately equal chances of
being either fired upon or actually shot by police in Chicago. This find-
ing is based on the exposure of civilians of each race to forcible felony
arrest encounters. Given this finding, one might argue that race is not a
significant factor in determining either persons shot at or persons struck
by police bullets. One could contend-and indeed others have con-
representation in the population at large does not seem to be the result of the age distribution
of each of the races, although our data on this point are not very precise. It is apparent from
Census data that both the black and Hispanic populations in Chicago have a greater percent-
age of'juveniles than does the white population. But these disparities are not parallel to the
disparities which appear in age-race distributions for the civilians who were shot by police.
65 Civilians of other races and those whose race was not ascertainable from source docu-
ments were excluded from the calculation.
66 There is a statistically significant difference between the forcible felony-based rate for
blacks and Hispanics fired upon but not necessarily hit by police.
18451981]
GELLER AND KARALES
tended based on data concerning other cities67 -that the disproportion-
ate shooting of blacks by police in those jurisdictions is explainable by
the disproportionate arrests of blacks for serious crimes. (To reiterate,
our data show that 70% of all civilians shot by police were black and
that 72% of all persons arrested for forcible felonies were black.)
TABLE 4
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES AT WHICH POLICE FIRED AT
CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO, 1975-1977, BY VICTIMS'
RACE
AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF CIVILIANS FIRED UPON:
Per 100,000
RACE OF population- Per 100,000 Per 1,000 for- Per 10,000
CIVILIANS 1970 population- cible felony arrests for all
FIRED UPON Census Updateda arrestsb  crimesc
White (79/yr.) 4.0 5.1 21.0 11.0
Black (358/yr.) 32.9 26.3 22.4 19.1
Hispanic
(42/yr.) 16.9 10.6 17.6 14.6
TOTAL
(478/yr.) 14.5 d 21.6 16.6
a The following numbers were used for calculating the rates: Updated population-
1,552,571 white; 1,363,879 black; 393,936 Hispanic.
b The following numbers were used for calculating the rates: Forcible felony arrests during
the three years (1975-1977)-I 1,252 white; 47,931 black; 7,117 Hispanic; 66,300 total.
c The following numbers were used for calculating the rates: Arrests for all offenses for the
three years (1975-1977)-214,192 white; 563,353 black; 85,635 Hispanic; 863,180 total.
d No revised total population figure was available.
Note: The standard "Z" test for equality of proportions was run for the rates in the forcible
felony column only. This test revealed that only the difference between blacks and
Hispanics is statistically significant at the .05 level.
But, as suggested above, we have some doubts about the use of ar-
rest figures as an explanation for differential shooting patterns for whites
and blacks. Arrest statistics have been criticized as a basis of compari-
son on the ground that arrests may not accurately reflect the number of
total encounters which civilians of different races have with police. If,
for example, police arrested eight out of every ten blacks who appeared




to be involved in some criminal conduct but only three out of every ten
such whites; or if police charged blacks and whites engaged in similar
misconduct with different offenses; or if police arrested blacks, but not
whites, for harassment purposes unrelated to suspected criminal con-
duct, then arrest rates would not be an accurate predictor of the number
of encounters (opportunities for shootings) between police and civilians
of different races.
While we have no data on the appropriateness of arrests, the data
we do have suggest that arrests may not be as strong a correlate of shoot-
ings as we assumed based on our literature review. Forcible felony ar-
rests and the number of civilians shot by police in Chicago show a +.64
correlation. While this is a moderately strong correlation for social sci-
ence research, it nevertheless means only that changes in the number of
arrests may he/p explain changes in the number of shootings. A myriad
of other factors besides arrests also could help account for trends in the
shooting rate. These factors could include the weather (big winter
storms could reduce certain kinds of street crime but increase assaultive
behavior due to "cabin fever"), number of officers on the street, the es-
tablishment of new shooting review procedures, fire department strikes
which strain police resources, threatened police job actions, overtime
employment to put more officers on patrol, quick promotions which in-
crease the number of supervisors and decrease by the same amount the
number of patrol officers, team policing, task forces, tumultuous may-
oral campaigns and consequent turmoil within the police department,
etc.
Another fact is important in considering arrest encounters as an
explanation for racial disproportions in shooting victims. The racial dis-
tribution of shooting victims which one finds considering the five years
of data together-20% white, 70% black, and 10% Hispanic-breaks
down when each year is considered separately. Taking the five years of
shooting data and forcible felony arrests together revealed that the ra-
cial distributions of shooting victims and arrestees were almost identical.
While the percentage of blacks arrested for forcible felonies remains at
approximately 70% each year, the percentage of civilians shot each year
who are black varies from a low of 63% to a high of 81%. (Some of this
apparent variability may result from the small numbers of civilians shot
each year. For example, the shooting of five fewer blacks or five more
whites in any given year could alter their percentages to the point where
the difference between the shooting and arrest distributions might be
insignificant.)
While forcible felony arrests are a moderately strong correlate of
shootings, that alone does not demonstrate a causal connection between




RACE AND INJURY OF CIVILIANS SHOT BY POLICE IN
CHICAGO, 1974-1978a
DEGREE OF INJURY (# OF CIVILIANS)
RACE OF
VICTIMS Wounded Killed % Killed
White 69 31 31%
Black 277 83 23%
Hispanic 34 16 32%
TOTAL 380 130 26%
a Using the X2 test of independence, there are no statistically significant differ-
ences among the fatality rates in the right hand column at the .05 level.
among many possible explanations for the racial distribution of shooting
victims. To further explore the role of race in police shootings, we turn
to two other inquiries: (1) an examination of the details of shootings to
see whether whites, blacks and Hispanics are shot under the same cir-
cumstances and with the same outcomes; and (2) consideration of the
race of both the civilians and officers involved in the same incidents.
B. RACE, DEGREE OF INJURY, AND SHOOTING TYPES
The outcomes (degree of injury to the civilian shot) are displayed in
Table 5. The table shows that black civilians are less likely than either
whites or Hispanics to die when struck by police bullets. Whereas 31%
of whites and 32% of Hispanics who are shot succumb to their wounds,
only 23% of blacks die. Again, based on the relatively small numbers
involved here, there is no statistically significant difference between the
fatality rates of civilians of different races, but the percentages could be
indicative of important differences. Since our data represent not a sam-
ple, but all of the shootings involving Chicago police officers over a five
year period, we can say with confidence that, from 1974 through 1978,
black civilians did experience the lowest fatality rate when shot by po-
lice. What we cannot assert with certainty is that this pattern is the
result of causes other than chance or that this pattern is likely to be
reflected in other time periods. (See the methodology section.) If the
pattern reported in Table 5 is not simply a chance occurrence, one
might expect that it would be explainable by reference to the circum-
stances in which civilians of each race were shot by police. This expecta-
tion arises because, as Table 2 shows, certain types of shooting incidents
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are more likely than others to result in fatalities. To test this hypothesis,
we considered the race of civilians shot in each type of incident. The
distributions are shown in Table 6.
Table 6 when compared with Table 2 does not seem to support the
notion that the somewhat higher black survival rate is the product of the
kinds of situations in which blacks are shot.68 Earlier, Table 2 showed
TABLE 6
RACE OF CIVILIANS SHOT BY POLICE IN CHICAGO, 1974-
1978, BY SHOOTING TYPESa
RACE OF CIVILIANS SHOT
SHOOTING TYPE White Black Hispanic Total
(1) Gun use/threat 35 199 28 262
Col.% 37% 55% 56% 52%
(2) Other d.w. or physical force 20 40 11 71
use/threat Col.% 21% 11% 22% 14%
(3) Other d.w. possessed with- 1 9 0 10
out threat Col.% 1% 3% - 2%
(4) Flight without other resist- 11 70 6 87
ance Col.% 12% 19% 12% 17%
(5) Other reasons for shooting 1 2 0 3
intentionally Col.% 1% 0.6% - 1%
(6) Accidental 21 27 4 52
Col.% 22% 8% 8% 10%
(7) Mistaken Identity 0 4 0 4
Col.% - 1% - 1%
(8) Stray Bullet 7 9 1 17
Col.% 7% 3% 2% 3%
TOTAL 96 360 50 5 0 6 b
Col.% 100%c 100%c 100% 100%
a Using the x2 test of significance for types 1-5, there are significant differences at the
.05 level. Types 6-8 were excluded from this test of significance because they repre-
sent qualitatively different kinds of events from types 1-5. However, an X2 test of
significance was conducted for accidental shootings separately, and revealed no sta-
tistically significant differences.
b Not ascertained/other race = 17.
c Does not total 100% due to rounding.
68 While the data are suggestive of no racial discrimination in seriousness of wound, the
data analysis is insufficiently refined to guarantee that the opposite conclusion is false. Future
study of the data in Tables 2 and 6 using two-way analysis of variance, if methodologically
feasible, could help researchers derive a more confident conclusion on this point.
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that civilians shot in one group of incidents (Types 1, 2, and 5) had
considerably higher fatality rates than those shot in another group (inci-
dent Types 3, 4, 6, and 8). The numbers in Type 7 are excluded because
they are too small to yield reliable results. Placing the figures in Table 6
into these two groups shows that 32% (115) of the black shooting victims
were shot in circumstances which yield a lower fatality rate, while 42%
(40) of the white shooting victims were shot in such cases. Accordingly,
from Table 6 one would expect that a smaller percentage of whites than
blacks would die when shot by police, exactly the opposite of what is
indicated in Table 5.
While Table 6 does not help explain differential fatality rates
among the races, it does suggest three additional disparities among civil-
ian victims of different races. First a higher percentage of the blacks and
Hispanics (than whites) who are shot by police reportedly were using or
threatening use of a gun at the time: 37% of the white shooting victims
allegedly fired or threatened to fire a gun, while more than half of all
black and Hispanic victims were reported to have done so at the time
they were shot by police. Another aspect of this disparity is that 11% of
black shooting victims were shot for allegedly using or threatening to use
physical force or a deadly weapon other than a gun, while 21% of white
civilians-and 22% of Hispanics-were shot under these circumstances.
Second, Table 6 shows that a larger percentage of whites than blacks is
shot accidentally. Of all white civilian shooting victims, 22% were shot
accidentally, while 8% of the black-and Hispanic-victims were shot
accidentally. The difference between these percentages was found not
to be statistically significant. However, such differences could be indica-
tive of important differences. If so, the fact that most of the officers are
white and that a large percentage of accidental shootings of civilians
involve family members or friends as victims could help explain the pat-
tern. The disproportionate number of white civilians shot accidentally
may also help explain the finding reported in connection with Table 3
that, based on forcible felony arrests, white civilians are slightly more
likely than black civilians to be shot by police.
The third noteworthy pattern shown in Table 6 is that, of all shoot-
ing victims, a slightly higher percentage of blacks (19%) than whites
(12%) is shot in flight. Our data do not permit us to assess whether this
disparity (although small) may stem from police beliefs about the rela-
tive chances of white and black fleeing suspects being armed, from dis-
criminatory behavior, or from other factors.69 But the data do permit a
69 Future research, equipped with data and analytic techniques which more sensitively
identify the degree of danger confronting a shooting officer--and thus the degree of discretion
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further investigation of the circumstances in which civilians of different
races were shot for fleeing. Table 7 indicates the crimes which police
reportedly suspected civilians of different races were fleeing from at the
time the civilians were shot.
Before describing the findings reported in Table 7, a few words of
explanation and qualification are appropriate. This table shows the
number of civilians shot in each circumstance as well as shooting rates.
The rates indicate the number of civilians shot for fleeing from each
type of suspected crime per 1,000 civilians of that race arrested for that
type of crime. The arrest figures are used as a proxy for the proportion
TABLE 7
FORCIBLE FELONIES WHICH POLICE SUSPECTED WHEN
THEY SHOT FLEEING CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO,
1974-1978, BY RACE OF CIVILIAN
VICTIMSa
SUSPECTED FORCIBLE RACE OF CIVILIANS SHOT
FELONY White Black Hispanic Total
Rape Number 0 2 0 2
Rateb - 0.7 - 0.5
Robbery Number 4 18 1 23
Rate 1.1 0.6 0.3 0.6
Burglary Number 6 33 2 41
Rate 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.8
Agg. Assault/ Number 1 12 3 16
Agg. Battery Rate 0.5 1.5 2.1 1.4
TOTAL Number 11 65 6 82c
Rate 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.8
a Using the X2 test of significance, there are no statistically significant differences in
crime types among the races at the .05 level.
b All rates in the table represent the number of civilians shot per 1,000 civilians of that
race arrested for the indicated offense.
c Not ascertained = 7.
he has whether to shoot-could better identify the impact of race on police shooting behavior.
With such relatively small numbers as are involved in shooting studies and so many factors
potentially affecting shooting, honing in on those instances in which racism is most likely to
influence police behavior would be desirable (even though it further reduces the numbers for
analysis). It is possible that the situations in which race might be an important influence on
officers' decisions to shoot or not shoot a civilian would amount to no more than five or ten
over a several-year period. Even if it were true that five or ten civilians were shot largely
because of their race during our study period, our data analysis probably is not sufficiently
sensitive and refined to identify these cases, in part since other factors may have greater ex-
planatory power. (Whether or not five or ten cases of racially motivated shootings out of




of civilians of each race who flee from attempted arrests. Thus, the rates
are used to indicate the chance that civilians of each race have of being
shot when they flee from attempted forcible felony arrests. The utility
of the rates depends on the accuracy of the assumption that whites,
blacks, and Hispanics are all equally as likely to flee when police at-
tempt to arrest them for forcible felonies. 70 If this is not the case (for
example, if fear of racist treatment at the hands of the criminal justice
system prompts a larger percentage of blacks and Hispanics than whites
to attempt to evade arrest), the rates would not give an accurate impres-
sion of the chances that civilians of each race have of being shot when
they flee.
If the rates do convey a relatively accurate impression of the
chances that fleeing suspects have of being shot, then Table 7 suggests
that blacks are 1.5 times more likely than whites to be shot for fleeing
from alleged forcible felonies, considering all the types of forcible felo-
nies together. Examining the offense types separately, blacks are twice
as likely as whites to be shot for fleeing from alleged burglaries and three
times as likely to be shot for fleeing from alleged serious assaults or bat-
teries. On the other hand, whites are nearly twice as likely as blacks to
be shot for running away from suspected robberies and armed robberies.
All the numbers on which these rates are based are small, however, and
the differences among the races were not found to be statistically signifi-
cant, so the findings are only suggestive. 71
While some of the data thus far examined do suggest racially linked
patterns of shootings, such patterns cannot simply be credited to ra-
cism, 72 for the preceding analysis omits a key consideration: the race of
the shooting officers in relation to the race of the civilian victims.
C. OFFICERS' RACE AND DUTY STATUS AND CIVILIANS' RACE
Thus far the question of shootings and race has been examined
treating police officers as a group and examining their collective behav-
ior towards civilians of different races. Below we consider the extent to
which officers of different races exhibit different shooting patterns-we
assess the slogan that "police are not black or white, they're blue." This
70 In any event, arrest rates would not be an accurate proxy for those who get away when
they flee.
71 Future research might profitably explore an additional question: Whether the kinds of
conduct by civilians of different races which result in specific charges, such as "aggravated
assault," are dissimilar in ways which suggest racial bias in charging decisions. If such bias is
discovered, one would need to control for it so as to permit an assessment of the likelihood
that civilians fleeing from similar misconduct will be shot.




notion is tested by comparing the race of both the civilian victims and
the shooting officers. The findings are depicted in Table 8. The num-
bers represent incidents rather than civilian victims (some incidents had
more than one victim). The rates show the number of shootings by
white, black and Hispanic officers per 1,000 officers of each race on the
Chicago police force. 73 These rates are presented in order to make the
relative conduct of white, black and Hispanic officers comparable by
controlling for the fact that the Department is not composed of equal
numbers of officers of each race.
TABLE 8
INCIDENTS IN WHICH POLICE SHOT CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO,
1974-1978: OFFICER RACE BY CIVILIAN RACEa
RACE OF CIVILIANS SHOT BY PO-
RACE OF OFFICER LICE
SHOOTERSb White Black Hispanic Total
White Number 84 206 44 334
Ratec 1.6 3.8 0.8 6.2
Black Number 5 111 3 119
Rate 0.4 9.5 0.3 10.2
Hispanic Number 4 1 4 9
Rate 3.3 0.8 3.3 7.5
White & Number 0 18 1 19
Black Rate - - - -
TOTAL Number 93 336 52 481d
Rate 1.4 5.0 0.8 7.2
a Dropping Hispanics from this table (because of small numbers), an X2 test of signifi-
cance shows significant differences at the .05 level.
b Race represents the race of all officers who shot civilians during the incidents. Thus,
the "White & Black" category of shooters means that both white and black officers
were involved in shooting civilians in the incidents. The single race categories mean
that all the officers who shot civilians in the incidents were of the same race.
c All rates are the average annual number of shooting incidents per 1,000 officers of
the indicated race in the Department.
d Not ascertained = 16.
73 The rates are based on Chicago Police Department computer printouts on personnel
for 1976, the midpoint of this five-year study. The size of the Department remained relatively
constant during this period, although the nature of the Department cannot necessarily be
assumed to have remained the same. For example, an increase of 100 sworn personnel in one
year could have reflected the attrition of 500 officers and the addition of 600 rookies or mini-
mal attrition with a much smaller number of inexperienced personnel added. The two situa-
tions could have different impacts on shooting patterns. Unfortunately, the data available to
us did not indicate how many officers were lost and added each year to the police force.
Unless otherwise indicated, the numbers of sworn personnel used to calculate all of the officer
rates in this section are as follows: total = 13,363 officers, made up of 10,775 white, 2,331
black, 240 Hispanic, and 17 Asian, Filipino and American Indian personnel.
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Table 8 shows that, overall, white officers shot civilians in 334
(70%) of all the incidents resulting in civilian victimization. Black of-
ficers shot civilians in 119 (25%), and Hispanic officers shot civilians in 9
(2%) of all such incidents. Mixed white and black officer teams shot
civilians in 19 (4%) of all the incidents. No teams of black and Hispanic
officers were involved in shooting civilians. Considering both the of-
ficers' race and the race of the civilians shot, white police shot black
civilians in almost twice as many incidents as did black police (206 vs.
111) but, controlling for the makeup of the police force, black officers
were 2.5 times as likely as white officers to shoot black civilians (annual
average of 9.5 shootings by black officers per 1,000 on the force vs. 3.8
shootings by white officers per 1,000 on the force). White officers were
four times as likely as black officers to shoot white civilians (rates of 1.6
vs. 0.4). The rates for shootings by Hispanic officers are based on a total
of nine shootings and thus would not be likely to yield reliable results.
(In 1976, the midpoint of this five-year study, 240 of the Department's
13,363 sworn personnel were Hispanic). White officers were 2.7 times
more likely than black officers to shoot Hispanic civilians (rates of 0.8 vs.
0.3).
Overall, minority-race officers were more likely than white officers,
per 1,000 officers of each race on the force, to shoot civilians. Based on
the data, if the Chicago Police Department were composed of 1,000
white, 1,000 black, and 1,000 Hispanic officers and nothing else changed
as a result of that makeup, 74 in an average year black officers would
shoot civilians in 10.2 incidents, Hispanic officers would shoot civilians
in 7.5 incidents, and white officers would shoot civilians in 6.2 incidents.
These projections show that black officers are 1.6 times more likely, and
Hispanic officers are 1.2 times more likely than white officers to shoot
civilians over the course of a year. (Again, the disproportion between
white and Hispanic officers is very slight, and not reliable because of the
small number of Hispanic shooters.) The Department is not so con-
structed, of course, and so the actual numbers of civilians shot are quite
different. Since most police officers are white, most of the white, black
and Hispanic civilians who are shot are shot by white officers.
The findings reported in Table 8 may have an important bearing
on the question of what role race plays in police shootings. While earlier
discussion in this section failed to establish a sufficient explanation for
why blacks are shot more than their representation in Chicago's popula-
74 The assumption that nothing else would change is, of course, false. Many things, espe-
cially deployment patterns, which affect shootings, would change if the force were composed
of equal numbers of white, black, and Hispanic personnel. The example is oversimplified to




RACE OF OFFICERS WHO SHOT CIVILIANS, BY DUTY
STATUS OF OFFICERSa
RACE OF OFFICER SHOOTERS
DuTy STATUS White Black Hispanic Total
ON Number 384 90 6 480
Rateb 7.1 7.7 5.0 7.2
Row % 80.0% 18.7% 1.3% 100%
% of CPD 80.6% 17.4% 2.0% 100%
OFF Number 70 61 5 136
Rate 1.3 5.2 4.2 2.0
Row % 51.0% 45.0% 4.0% 100%
% of CPD 80.6% 17.4% 2.0% 100%
TOTAL Number 454 151 11 616c
Rate 8.4 13.0 9.2 9.2
Row % 74.0% 25.0% 2.0% 100%
% of CPD 80.6% 17.4% 2.0% 100%
a Usink an X2 test of significance, the black-white difference ir significant at the .05
level.
b All rates = average annual number of officers who shot civilians per 1,000 officers of
the indicated race on the Chicago police force.
c Not ascertained = 24.
tion suggests they would be, the data in Table 8 raise considerations that
inhibit the conclusion that racism explains this disproportion. As Table
8 shows, correcting for their representation in the police force, black of-
ficers are more likely than white officers to shoot black civilians. More-
over, white officers are more likely than black officers to shoot white
civilians, and Hispanic officers (whose numbers are too small to yield
reliable patterns) seem more likely than either white or black officers to
shoot Hispanic civilians. One would expect that, if racism were a key
explanation for police shootings, the rates of shootings would be highest
where the races of the officers and civilians involved in a given incident
were not the same.
The higher shooting rate for black officers than. for white officers
requires further analysis. Two explanations have been offered by other
researchers 75 for disproportionate involvement of black officers in shoot-
ings: (1) disproportionate assignment of such officers to high-crime ar-
eas, and (2) housing patterns in which most black officers live and,
consequently, spend most of their off-duty time in high-crime areas and
most white officers live and spend most of their time off in low-crime
areas. The first explanation has been used as a reason for over-represen-
75 See, e.g., Fyfe, Shots Fired, supra note 6.
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tation of minority officers among on-duty shooters; the second has appli-
cation primarily to off-duty shooting patterns.
At this level of analysis, the first explanation is not called for in
Chicago because, as Table 9 shows, the over-representation of black of-
ficers as shooters (they shoot 25% of the civilians shot by police) is pri-
marily an off-duty phenomenon. The on-duty officers who shot civilians
fall into almost precisely the same racial distribution as the Depart-
ment's overall composition. That is, white officers are 80.6% of the De-
partment and 80% of the on-duty shooters; black officers are 17.4% of
the Department's sworn personnel and 18.7% of the on-duty shooters;
and for Hispanic officers, the percentages are 2% and 1.3%, respectively.
Put another way, Table 9 shows that black and white officers (Hispanic
officers are omitted because of their small numbers) were approximately
equally likely, based on their representation on the force, to be involved
in on-duty shootings (7.1 white officers per 1,000 in the Department vs.
a black officer rate of 7.7).
It is interesting to note, however, that while black officers are not
significantly over-represented as on-duty shooters, they are indeed dis-
proportionately assigned to high-crime districts.76 Thirty-five percent of
the patrol officers assigned to high crime districts are black.77
Although the disproportionate assignment of black officers to high-
crime districts does not help explain the over-representation of black of-
ficers as shooters, deployment patterns are indeed useful in explaining
the geographic distribution of shootings by officers of different races.
Table 10 shows the distribution of shootings by on-duty white, black
and Hispanic officers among three categories of crime districts: high,
medium, and low. The table shows that black officers are 6.2% of the
officers who shot civilians in low-crime districts, 16.7% of the officers
who did so in medium-crime districts, and 24.5% of the officers who did
so in high-crime districts. White officers, who are disproportionately as-
signed to low-crime districts, are 92.3% of the officers who shot civilians
in low-crime districts, 81.3% of the officers who did so in medium-crime
districts and 74.5% of the officers who did so in high-crime districts. The
76 "High-crime district" is defined in conjunction with Table 10 in the text.
77 The Department offers two principal explanations for this pattern: that officers prefer
to work in districts close to their homes and that the assignment of minority race officers to
minority communities produces a better police-community rapport and hence better police
work. Over the years, critics of racial assignment patterns have not seriously disputed the
wisdom of these two rationales (indeed, sometimes minority community leaders have de-
manded adherence to them). Rather, such critics have complained that minority race officers
receive the least desirable assignments within their given districts and are less likely than




CRIME LEVEL OF DISTRICTS IN WHICH ON-DUTY POLICE
SHOT CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978, BY
OFFICERS' RACEa
CRIME LEVEL OF
RACE OF OFFICERS WHO
SHOT CIVILIANS
DIST. OF SHOOTING White Black Hispanic Total
Low b  Number 60 4 1 65
Row % 92.3% 6.2% 1.5% 100%
Mediumc Number 175 36 4 215
Row% 81.3% 16.7% 1.9% 100%
Highd Number 149 50 1 200
Row % 74.5% 25.0% 0.5% 100%
TOTAL Number 384 90 6 480
Row % 80.0% 18.7% 1.3% 100%
a Using the X2 test of significance, black-white differences are significant at the .05 level.
b Low-crime districts = 200 or less forcible felonies (crimes of personal violence plus
burglary) per 10,000 population per year in a district.
c Medium-crime districts = districts with 201-300 forcible felonies per 10,000 popula-
tion per year.
d High-crime districts = districts with more than 300 forcible felonies per 10,000 popu-
lation per year.
number of Hispanic officers who shot civilians is too small to serve as a
reliable basis for analysis.
An explanation for the fact that black officers are not significantly
over-represented as on-duty shooters despite their disproportionate de-
ployment in high-crime districts may lie in the assignment patterns of
officers of different races, not according to districts but according to
units of the Department. Thus far, we have considered the deployment
pattern only of officers in the Patrol Divisiofi of the Department. That
division is by far the Department's largest, containing approximately
80% of all the sworn personnel on the force. It is the black officers of that
division who are disproportionately assigned to high-crime districts. But
other units, in which black officers are under-represented, are considera-
bly more likely than Patrol Division officers to become involved in
shootings. Table 11 shows the percentage of black officers in each of
several units of the Department and the rate at which officers of each
unit shot civilians.
Table 11 indicates that officers assigned to the Special Operations
Group (a separately-focused tactical squad), the district tactical units,
and the Robbery Division are far more likely than officers in most other
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units to shoot civilians while on duty. (S.O.G. personnel, who represent
0.6% of the Department, are 5.7% of the on-duty shooters; Tactical of-
ficers are 3.3% of the Department's sworn personnel and 20.4% of the
on-duty officers who shot civilians; and Robbery detectives are 1.8% of
all officers but 4.7% of the on-duty shooters. Officers in these three units
are over-represented as on-duty shooters, based solely on their numbers
in the, Department.) At the same time, the table indicates that black
officers are considerably under-represented in these units. Using the
figure of 17.4% (overall black representation on the Department, regard-
less of unit of assignment) as a dividing line, the units shown in this table
can be arranged into those with an under-representation of Black of-
ficers--S.O.G., Tactical, Robbery, Homicide/Sex, Burglary, and Traf-
fic-and those with an over-representation-Mass Transit, Gang
Crimes, and the Patrol Division. Taken together, on-duty officers of the
units with a black "under-representation" shoot an annual average of
22.6 civilians for every 1,000 officers in those units. On-duty officers in
the units with a black "over-representation," by contrast, shoot an aver-
age of 7.2 civilians per year, for every 1,000 officers in those units. The
implication of these findings is that black officers are not over-repre-
sented among on-duty shooters, despite their heavy deployment in high-
crime districts, because black officers are not prominent in the units of
the Police Department which see the most shooting action.
TABLE 11
BLACK REPRESENTATION AND RATE OF SHOOTINGS OF
CIVILIANS BY CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT
UNITS, 1974-1978
% BLACK PER-






Mass Transit 25.9% 8.5





a All rates = average annual number of officers in unit who shot civilians,
per 1,000 officers in unit.
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As indicated in Table 9, black officers are, indeed, over-represented
among off-duty shooters: 45% of the officers who shot civilians while off
duty were black. Comparison of the rates in Table 9 shows that off-duty
black officers are four times more likely than off-duty white officers to
shoot civilians (rates of 5.2 vs. 1.3). The second traditional explanation
for disproportionate involvement of black officers in shootings men-
tioned earlier-residential patterns-seems relevant to explaining this
phenomenon in Chicago. We do not have data on the residence of Chi-
cago police personnel, but the Department has estimated that black of-
ficers live predominantly in high- and medium-crime districts and that
white officers live predominantly in low- and medium-crime districts of
the City.
Table 12 shows that the distribution of off-duty officers of each race
who shot civilians conforms closely to the suggested residential patterns
of officers. Ninety-three percent of the black off-duty officers who shot
civilians did so in medium- or high-crime areas, whereas 90% of the
white off-duty officers who shot civilians did so in low- or medium-
crime districts. Based on the rates in the table, off-duty white officers
TABLE 12
CRIME LEVEL OF DISTRICTS IN WHICH OFF-DUTY POLICE
SHOT CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978, BY
OFFICERS' RACEa
CRIME LEVEL OF DISTRICT OF
RACE OF OFFICERS SHOOTING
WHO SHOT CIVILIANS Lowb Mediumc Highd Total
White Number 31 32 7 70
Ratee 0.6 0.6 0.1 1.3
Black Number 4 23 34 61
Rate 0.3 2.0 2.9 5.2
Hispanic Number 0 4 1 5
Rate - 3.3 0.8 4.2
TOTAL Number 35 59 42 136
Rate 0.5 0.9 0.6 2.0
a Using the X2 test of significance, black-white differences are significant at the .05
level.
b Low-crime districts are those with 200 or less forcible felonies (crimes of personal
violence plus burglary) per 10,000 population per year.
c Medium-crime districts are those with 201-300 forcible felonies per 10,000 popula-
tion per year.
d High-crime districts are those with more than 300 forcible felonies per 10,000 popu-
lation per year.
e All rates = average annual number of officers who shot civilians, per 1,000 officers of
the indicated race on the police force.
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are twice as likely as off-duty black officers to shoot a civilian in a low-
crime district. But off-duty black officers are 29 times more likely than
off-duty white officers to shoot a civilian in a high-crime district (rates of
2.9 vs. 0.1). These findings on race and off-duty shootings are consistent
with the hypothesis that officers who live in high-crime areas will be
more likely than officers living in quiet neighborhoods to encounter vio-
lence during their time off and thus to use their weapons.
Since distinct differences appear in the on- and off-duty shooting
patterns of officers based on their races, with black officers showing a
substantial over-representation among off-duty shooters, we will ex-
amine the kinds of shootings in which officers of each race become in-
volved when on- and off-duty to explore whether there are further
variations among officers of different races. Tables 13 and 14 show the
eight kinds of shootings in our typology for on- and off-duty officers,
respectively.
Although neither Table 13 nor Table 14 display statistically signifi-
cant differences, it seems appropriate to discuss patterns shown on the
possibility that the tables do suggest important differences (see method-
ology section). Indeed, it seems very likely that the lack of statistically
significant differences in Table 14 is primarily the result of the small
numbers it contains, since the difference between black and white of-
ficers in the "gun use/threat" category is fairly large. Thus, Tables 13
and 14 together suggest that, while on-duty black officers are slightly
more likely than on-duty white officers to shoot civilians for allegedly
using or threatening to use a gun, the disparity is pronounced for off-
duty officers. Off-duty black officers are more than eight times as likely
as off-duty white officers to shoot civilians for allegedly using or threat-
ening to use a gun. This pattern may well result from denser concentra-
tion of guns in communities where black officers live than in areas where
most white officers reside. Officers who shot civilians for fleeing from
suspected forcible felonies do not follow precisely the same pattern. Rel-
atively few off-duty officers shot fleeing felony suspects, so any differ-
ences between these off-duty officers are based on numbers too small to
suggest reliable results. But the numbers of on-duty officers who shot
fleeing suspects are considerably larger. These latter numbers show that
on-duty white officers are more than twice as likely as on-duty black
officers to shoot fleeing forcible felony suspects. Looking only at rates in
Table 13 shows that on-duty black officers are seven times more likely to
shoot gun-wielding suspects than they are to shoot fleeing felony sus-
pects. On-duty white officers, in contrast, are only 2.7 times more likely
to shoot civilians with guns than they are to shoot fleeing suspects. A




CIVILIANS SHOT BY ON-DUTY POLICE IN CHICAGO, 1974-
1978: OFFICER RACE BY SHOOTING TYPEa
RACE OF OFFICER SHOOTERS
SHOOTING TYPE White Black Hispanic- Total
(1) Gun use/threat Numberb 218 57 3 278
Ratec 4.1 4.9 2.5 4.2
Col.% 55.9% 64.8% 50.0% 57.4%
(2) Other d.w. or Number 52 14 1 67
physical force Rate 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.0
use/threat Col.% 13.3% 15.9% 16.7% 13.8%
(3) Other d.w. pos- Number 14 2 0 16
sessed without Rate 0.3 0.2 - 0.2
threat Col.% 3.6% 2.3% - 3.3%
(4) Flight without Number 79 8 0 87
other resistance Rate 1.5 0.7 - 1.3
Col.% 20.3% 9.1% - 18.0%
(5) Other reasons for Number 2 0 0 2.
shooting Rate 0.04 - - 0.03
intentionally Col.% 0.5% - - 0.4%
(6) Accidental Number 17 7 2 26
Rate 0.3 0.6 1.7 0.4
Col.% 4.4% 8.0% 33.3% 5.4%
(7) Mistaken Identity -Number 3 0 0 3
Rate 0.1 - - 0.05
Col.% 0.8% - - 0.6%
(8) Stray Bullet Number 5 0 0 5
Rate 0.1 - - 0.08
Col.% 1.3% - - 1.0%
TOTAL Number 390 88 6 484
d
Rate 1.2 7.6 5.0 7.2
Col.% 100% e  100%e  100% 100%
e
a Using the X2 test of significance, there is not a statistically significant difference be-
tween shooting types 1-5 for black and white officers at the .05 level.
b Number of on-duty officers who shot civilians.
c All rates are the average annual number of on-duty officers who shot civilians per
1,000 officers of the indicated race on the police force.
d Not ascertained = 13.
e Does not total 100% due to rounding.
based on Table 14. These findings suggest that, both on and off duty,
black officers may be exposed to gun-wielding suspects more often and
to fleeing felony suspects less often than are white officers.
It is also interesting to note that no strong racially-linked patterns
18611981]
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emerge for officers involved in accidental shootings. Both on- and off-
duty, white and black officers have approximately the same chance of
TABLE 14
CIVILIANS SHOT BY OFF-DUTY POLICE IN CHICAGO, 1974-
1978: OFFICER RACE BY SHOOTING TYPEa
RACE OF OFFICER SHOOTERS
SHOOTING TYPE White Black Hispanic Total
(1) Gun use/threat Numberb 22 38 2 62
Ratec 0.4 3.3 1.7 0.9
Col.% 31.9% 63.3% 40.0% 46.3%
(2) Other d.w. or Number 11 6 1 18
physical force Rate 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.3
use/threat. Col.% 15.9% 10.0% 20.0% 13.4%
(3) Other d.w. pos- Number 0 0 0 0
sessed without Rate - - - -
threat Col.% - - - -
(4) Flight without Number 11 8 1 20
other resistance Rate 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.3
Col.% 15.9% 13.3% 20.0% 14.9%
(5) Other reasons for Number 1 0 0 1
shooting Rate 0.02 - - 0.02
intentionally Col.% 1.4% - - 0.7%
(6) Accidental Number 19 6 1 26
Rate 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.4
Col.% 27.5% 10.0% 20.0% 19.4%
(7) Mistaken Identity Number 1 1 0 2
Rate 0.02 0.1 - 0.03
Col.% 1.4% 1.7% - 1.5%
(8) Stray Bullet Number 4 1 0 5
Rate 0.1 0.1 - 0.08
Col.% 5.8% 1.7% - 3.7%
TOTAL Number 69 60 5 134d
Rate 1.3 5.2 4.2 2.0
Col.% 100%e 100% 100% 100%C
a Using the x2 test of significance, there is not a statistically significant difference be-
tween shooting types 1-5 for black and white officers at the .05 level.
b Number of ofduty officers who shot civilians.
c All rates are the average annual number of of-duty officers who shot civilians per
1,000 officers of the indicated race on the police force.
d Not ascertained = 2.




shooting civilians accidentally. 78 (The numbers of Hispanic officers in-
volved in accidental and most other categories of shootings are simply
too small to form a reliable basis for analysis.)
Thus far, in an attempt to test for racially-linked shooting patterns,
we have compared the races of the officer shooters with the races of the
civilian victims, with the shooting types, and with the officers' duty sta-
tus. We have also considered the civilians' degree of injury in relation to
shooting types. The following table, the final one in this section,
presents the data from a slightly different perspective. In Table 15 the
degree of injury of civilians of different races is examined in relation to
the races of the shooting officers. Only on-duty shootings are included
because off-duty shootings, for reasons associated with residential pat-
terns, are very frequently intra-racial events and could, therefore, hide
racial patterns in on-duty shootings.
The numbers presented in Table 15 are not strictly comparable to
the numbers in Table 8. While Table 8 uses numbers of incidents in
which civilians were shot, Table 15 uses numbers of civilians shot during
those incidents. But since only 25 incidents had more than one civilian
victim, rough comparisons can be made.79 The rates in Table 15, as in
Table 8, are the average annual number of events per 1,000 police of-
ficers of the indicated race in the Chicago Police Department. Table 15
shows not only the total number and rate of civilians shot, but also pro-
vides a breakdown of the numbers and rates for civilians who were
wounded and civilians who were killed.
Thus, Table 15 is particularly useful for examining whether on-
duty shootings reveal differential fatality rates depending on the races of
both the officers and the civilians involved. The results of this question
are noteworthy, although in some cases based on small numbers. Both
white and black on-duty officers have close to a 50-50 chance of killing
white civilians when they shoot them. (Overall, approximately 40% of
the white civilians shot by on-duty police die from the wounds.) In
contrast, both white and black on-duty officers have a far greater chance
of wounding than killing black civilians. On-duty white officers are more
than four times as likely to wound as they are to kill a black civilian.
On-duty black officers are 2.5 times more likely to wound than to kill a
black civilian. This suggested pattern of black civilians surviving shoot-
78 Although the on-duty rates are 0.3 for white officers and 0.6 for black officers, the
actual numbers involved are so small that we did not consider these rates to be meaningfully
different.
79 Peculiarities of the coding system made it convenient to present the data in these
slightly different forms in Tables 8 and 15.
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ing incidents more often than white civilians has been noted earlier,
without a satisfactory explanation, but Table 15 adds the information
that the apparent survival rate difference holds regardless of the race of
the officers doing the shooting.80
Stepping back from the specific question of degree of injury, signifi-
cant differences are revealed in the likelihood that on-duty officers of
different races will shoot civilians of different races. On-duty white of-
ficers are four times as likely to shoot black civilians as they are to shoot
white civilians (rates of 3.7 vs. 0.9). But on-duty black officers are more
than 15 times as likely to shoot black civilians as they are to shoot white
civilians (rates of 4.6 vs. 0.3). In this instance, deployment patterns,
which earlier were not considered applicable, may help explain the re-
sult. The concentration of white officers in white communities and of
black officers in black communities presents black officers with a far
greater number of occasions than white officers have when they might
become involved in a shooting incident with black civilians.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, a definitive conclusion on the possible role of racism as a
motivating factor in police shootings of civilians is impossible without
far more extensive and intensive data and statistical analysis techniques
than we have been able to use. The disproportionate involvement of
black civilians as shooting victims could not be fully explained on the
basis of our data. We considered it important, however, to look at the
disproportionate shooting of black civilians in light of the race of the
officer shooters. A number of patterns emerge regarding the race of
both officers and civilians, some suggesting over-involvement of black
officers as shooters, others suggesting over-involvement of white officers
as shooters. These patterns, however, seem explainable by residency
and deployment patterns of officers of different races. For example,
80 Further research should be conducted to examine whether other factors might explain
differential survival rates. For example, the age distributions of blacks and whites may differ
in a way which increases the likelihood of blacks surviving their wounds more often than
whites. Such differences might also increase the chances that black suspects will be better
than white suspects at eluding efforts by police to arrest them with use of deadly force. A
sizeable random sample of non-shooting incidents is required for comparison to shooting
cases.
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TABLE 15
CIVILIANS SHOT BY ON-DUTY POLICE IN CHICAGO, 1974-
1978: OFFICER RACE BY CIVILIAN RACE AND
CIVILIAN INJURYa
RACE OF OFFICER RACE OF CIVILIANS SHOT
SHOOTERS White Black Hispanic Total
All White Nb = 48 200f 29 277
Total Ratec = 0.9 3.7 0.5 5.1
Wd Ke W K W K W KWo'unded- - -
killed 27 21 160 38 17 12 204 71
breakdown 0.5 0.4 3.0 0.7 0.3 0.2 3.8 1.3
All Black 4 53 2 59
Total 0.3 4.6 0.2 5.1
Wounded- W K W K W K W K
killed 2 2 38 15 2 0 42 17
breakdown 0.2 0.2 3.3 1.3 0.2 - 3.6 1.5
All Hispanic 2 0 3 5
Total 1.7 - 2.5 4.2
Wounded- W K W K W K W K
killed 2 0 0 0 3 0 5 0
breakdown 1.7 - - - 2.5 - 4.2 -
Other/Not Asc.
Total 3 23 1 27
Wounded-
killed W K W K W K W K
breakdown 3 0 14 9 0 1 17 10
TOTAL 57 274 35 366
Total 0.9 4.1 0.5 5.5
Wounded- W K W K W K W K
killed 34 23 212 62 22 13 268 98
breakdown 0.5 0.3 3.2 0.9 0.3 0.2 4.0 1.5
RACE OF OFFICER RACE OF CIVILIANS SHOT
SHOOTERS White Black Hispanic Total
a Using the x2 test of significance, there are statistically significant differences in the
rates for shootings by white officers but not in the rates for black officers. The small
sample size is very likely the principal reason for the lack of significant differences in
black officers' shooting rates. The significant differences for white officers apply, e.g.,
to the chances that white officers have of killing white civilians as opposed to the
chances they have of killing black civilians.
b N = number of civilians shot by on-duty police officers.
c All rates, including those under the "W" and "K" headings, are the average annual
number of civilians shot by officers of the indicated race per 1,000 officers of that race
on the Chicago police force.
d & e "W" = civilians wounded and "K' = civilians killed.
f Includes 2 civilians whose injury was not ascertained. Therefore, the wounded and
killed breakdowns in this cell total only 198.
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black officers are a vastly disproportionate number of the off-duty shoot-
ers; but they also generally reside in far more hazardous neighborhoods
than do white officers. As to on-duty shootings, officers of each race
shoot approximately as often as might be expected from their represen-
tation on the police force. This is not simply the result of deployment
patterns which assign officers in relation to their representation on the
force (for that is not the reality), but it is possible that racially-linked
deployment patterns counteract one another so that, in the final analy-
sis, on-duty officers shoot in proportion to their numbers on the police
force. Such counteracting patterns may be exemplified by the dispro-
portionate assignment of black officers to high-crime districts but the
disproportionate assignment of white officers in those high-crime dis-
tricts to the units (Special Operations Group, Tactical) which have the
highest shooting rates. What can be said, on the basis of the research we
have done this far, is this: While our data are not adequate for drawing
confident conclusions, our analysis does not reveal findings which, on
balance, are consistent with the racism theory.
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